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 AS/EA LXIV•2•2010, S. 341–385 
“A FIVE-TRUNKED, FOUR-TUSKED ELEPHANT 
IS RUNNING IN THE SKY” 
How Free is Imagination According to 
Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta? 
Isabelle Ratié, EPHE, Paris 
Équipe de recherche «Monde indien» 
Abstract 1 
According to the Śaiva non dualists Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925-975) and Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975-
1025), imaginary objects, far from being a mere rearrangement of previously perceived elements, 
are original creations resulting from consciousness’s free creativity. The present article examines 
how the Pratyabhijñā philosophers defend this thesis against Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka theories 
of imagination, but also how they link it with their idealism, since Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta 
contend that the phenomenal world is created by a universal consciousness through a process 
similar to the individual subject’s activity of imagination. They thus state – as the Advaita 
Vedāntins or the Buddhist Vijñānavādins – that the world is an imaginary construction, but they 
refuse to draw from this the conclusion that it is unreal: paradoxically, they consider that the world 
is real insofar as it is imagined, and they see imagination as an experience capable of leading the 
individual subject to liberation. 
Is imagination the experience of consciousness’ freedom to create a world of its 
own at will? Or are the so-called creations of imagination nothing but memories 
of elements that the imagining subject has perceived in the past and that he 
merely combines in a different fashion? And do we imagine because we are 
determined to build certain mental images by a mechanism of residual traces left 
by previous experiences – or because, in that “kingdom of the mind” (mano-
rājya) that constitutes the domain of imagination, consciousness exercises its 
sovereign power by manifesting whatever it pleases to invent? In other words: 
1 I would like to thank Alexis Sanderson, with whose generous help I read many of the 
passages of the ĪPV presented here; David Shulman, for sharing some of his forthcoming 
works on imagination in classical India in general and in Indian aesthetics in particular; and 
Marie-Claude Porcher, who read an earlier version of this paper, for her kind words of 
encouragement. 
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how free is imagination? I would like to examine here the philosophical answer 
given to this question by two Kashmirian Śaiva non-dualists, Utpaladeva (fl. c. 
925–950 AD) and Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 AD), in those of their works 
that belong to the Pratyabhijñā corpus.2 In doing so, I wish to emphasize that for 
these philosophers what is at stake here is much more than a correct epistemo-
logical understanding of the way individuals can create imaginary entities: for 
them as for their opponents the answer to the question “how free is imagina-
tion?” is crucial in determining the nature of consciousness in general and the 
relation between consciousness and the world of our perceptions. 
1. Imagination According to Utpaladeva: 
A Spontaneous Act of Creation 
Utpaladeva’s position regarding the extent of imagination’s freedom is unambi-
guously stated in his ĪPK: 
 sa naisargika evāsti vikalpe svairacāriṇi / yathābhimatasaṃsthānābhāsanād buddhi-
gocare //3 
 The [conscious manifestation] is perfectly spontaneous (naisargika eva) in [the case of] a 
mental construction (vikalpa) that wanders autonomously (svairacārin), since [it] manifests 
[this or that] configuration (saṃsthāna) at will (yathābhimata) in the realm of the intellect 
(buddhi). 
The verse is implicitly referring to a distinction between perception (pratyakṣa), 
in which we are simply and immediately aware of something’s presence, and 
mental construction (vikalpa), in which the mind elaborates or builds its object 
instead of merely being aware of its presence. But Utpaladeva is also dis-
tinguishing here between two types of mental constructions: according to him, 
some of them are not spontaneous insofar as they are entirely determined by 
some other mental event, whereas others are free of such a determination. For 
instance, when we remember, we are indeed elaborating an object that is not 
present hic et nunc; but our capacity to remember is not free, for according to 
2 That is, Utpaladeva’s ĪPK and their commentaries (which include Utpaladeva’s V tti as well 
as Abhinavagupta’s ĪPV and ĪPVV). The text of the ĪPV quoted here is that of the KSTS 
edition, but several manuscripts (and the Bhāskarī edition) are also quoted within brackets 
whenever an emendation is proposed (“p.n.p.” means “the passage is not preserved in...”). 
3 ĪPK I, 6, 10. 
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most Indian philosophical schools (including the Pratyabhijñā), this memory is 
in fact triggered by a mechanism of residual traces (saṃskāra). Thus when 
seeing a certain cup, I remember having drunk a cup of coffee this morning: the 
sight of the cup triggers the remembrance of the past experience by provoking 
the “awakening” (prabodha) of a thus far latent trace left in my consciousness 
by the past experience.4 In this regard, remembering is not a free or autonomous 
(svatantra) activity: it is determined by a complex mechanism of residual traces. 
As Abhinavagupta has already explained while commenting on the previous 
verse,5 a number of cognitions are not autonomous insofar as they thus depend 
on the residual trace of a previous perception that makes them possible and 
shapes them. These cognitions include not only memory (smaraṇa), but also a 
kind of poetical fancy (utprekṣā) which we could be tempted to classify under 
the Western category of “imagination” and through which we playfully see 
something as what it is not in reality,6 or the determination (adhyavasāya) which 
arises immediately after a perception and conceptualizes it.7 
4 On the role played by residual traces in memory according to Utpaladeva and Abhinava-
gupta, see RATIÉ 2006, pp. 49 ff. 
5 See ĪPV, vol. I, p. 267: smaraṇa utprekṣaṇe pratyakṣap ṣṭhabhāviny adhyavasāye ca 
yo’ntarnīlādyavabhāso bāhyatayāvabhāsayitavyo nāsau svātmīyo’pi tu pūrvānubhava-
saṃskārajo’sau. “In memory (smaraṇa), fancy (utprekṣā) and the determined cognition 
(adhyavasāya) which occurs following a perception, the manifestation of [the object] – the 
blue for instance –, which is internal [and] must be manifested as external [insofar as it is 
distinguished from the subject,] is not autonomous (na[…]svātmīyaḥ); rather, it is produced 
by a residual trace (saṃskāra) [left] by a previous experience.” 
6 Thus, as a figure of speech (alaṃkāra), utprekṣā is defined by Daṇḍin in the following way 
(KĀ II, 221): anyathaiva sthitā v ttiś cetanasyetarasya vā / anyathotprekṣyate yatra tām 
utprekṣām vidur // “[Good poeticians] know that utprekṣā occurs in a case where the way of 
being (v tti) of [something] – be it sentient or not –, which happens in a certain manner, is 
fancied (utprekṣyate) as [happening] otherwise.” In later works of poetics it becomes more 
difficult to distinguish it from comparison (upamā), but the notion of imagination or fancy 
remains; see e.g. KP X, 92ab, which describes it as “fancying (sambhāvana) the described 
object [as being] a similar [object]” (sambhāvanam athotprekṣā prak tasya samena yat); cf. 
Śrīvidyācakravartin’s commentary, Ibid.: upamānatvenopameyasya sambhāvanam utprekṣā. 
“utprekṣā is fancying the compared as being the comparing.” Mammaṭa gives an example 
from the M cchakaṭika (I, 34) of such playful identifications: limpatīva tamo’ṅgāni 
varṣatīvāñjanaṃ nabhaḥ. “Darkness anoints bodies as it were; the sky showers a black 
collyrium as it were.” M. C. Porcher has emphasized the importance of sambhāvana as the 
activity of imagination essential in this figure (see PORCHER 1978, p. 99); cf. SHULMAN 
forthcoming, p. 5: utprekṣā “assumes a certain imaginary leap” and involves “an ima-
ginative reconfiguration of reality”. However, according to the Pratyabhijñā philosophers, 
there is a crucial difference between this kind of fancy and an imaginary construction 
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However, some mental elaborations are spontaneous (naisargika) or free 
(svatantra). Everybody has the banal and marvellous power of imagining things 
that have never been perceived at all (so that these things cannot be suspected of 
being simply determined by some residual trace): we may imagine “a white, 
two-trunked, one-hundred-tusked elephant”,8 or “a ten-tusked elephant”,9 or “a 
white elephant whose head has three trunks and ten tusks”,10 or “a five-trunked, 
four-tusked elephant running in the sky”, 11  or indeed, any other impossible 
creature of this sort – and in doing so, we all experience freedom (svātantrya): 
________________________________ 
(manorājyasaṃkalpa): the former is still very much dependent on perception insofar as it 
focuses on a perceived object with which it plays, whereas the latter creates its own object. 
From this point of view, it is quite meaningful that some poeticians such as Ruyyaka 
consider utprekṣā as a kind of “determination” (adhyavasāya; see SHULMAN forthcoming, p. 
9): Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta also consider that utprekṣā and adhyavasāya have a 
particular affinity insofar as they determine a pre-existing object instead of creating it (see 
the following fn. for the notion of adhyavasāya). 
7 According to the Buddhist epistemologists (whose terminology is borrowed here by the 
Pratyabhijñā philosophers), perception (pratyakṣa), which apprehends the ineffable presence 
of a strictly singular and momentary entity, is usually immediately followed by a mental 
construction (vikalpa) that determines it for instance as “this is blue” through a process of 
exclusion (vyāv tti), and perception becomes useful in practical life (and constitutes a valid 
means of knowledge, pramāṇa) only insofar as it triggers this determination. See e.g. NBṬ, 
pp. 83–85: anīlabodhavyāv ttyā ca nīlabodharūpatvaṃ vyavasthāpyam. vyavasthāpakaś ca 
vikalpapratyayaḥ pratyakṣabalotpanno draṣṭavyaḥ. na tu nirvikalpatvāt pratyakṣam eva 
nīlabodharūpatvenātmanam avasthāpayituṃ śaknoti. niścayapratyayenāvyavasthāpitaṃ sad 
api nīlabodharūpaṃ vijñānam asatkalpam eva. tasmān niścayena nīlabodharūpaṃ vya-
vasthāpitaṃ vijñānaṃ nīlabodhātmanā sad bhavati. tasmād adhyavasāyaṃ kurvad eva 
pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhavati. “And through the exclusion (vyāv tti) of whatever is not the 
cognition of blue (anīlabodha) it might be established that [a perception] consists in the 
cognition of blue (nīlabodha). And what establishes [it] is the cognition [consisting in] a 
mental construction (vikalpa) that can be seen to arise because of perception (pratyakṣa). 
But perception alone, [without any mental construction,] cannot establish itself as consisting 
in the cognition of blue, [precisely] because it is devoid of mental construction (nirvikalpa): 
a cognition that has not been established by a cognition [consisting in] a judgement (ni-
ścaya) as consisting in the cognition of blue, although existing, is as good as non-existent 
(asatkalpam eva). Therefore a cognition that has been established to be the cognition of blue 
by a judgement exists as this cognition of blue; [and] as a consequence, perception is a 
means of knowledge (pramāṇa) only insofar as it produces a determination (adhyavasāya).” 
8 ĪPV, vol. I, p. 270, quoted below. 
9 ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 381, quoted below. 
10 ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 331, quoted below. 
11 ĪPV, vol. II, pp. 264–265, quoted below. 
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 yaḥ pratyakṣavyāpāram anupajīvan vyākṣepasāratayā manorājyasaṃkalpādivikalpaḥ sa 
svairaṃ k tvā svapreraṇena parapreraṇanairapekṣyeṇa svātantryeṇa caraty udeti vyayate 
ca, tatra yo bahiravabhāso nīlāder antarābhāsamayasya sa naisargika eva. tathā hy 
aparid ṣṭapūrvam api śvetaṃ daśanaśatakalitakarayugalayuktaṃ dantinam antaḥ pra-
māt bhūmau sthitaṃ bahir antaḥkaraṇabhūmau svacchadhīdarpaṇātmikāyāṃ sa vikalpas 
tātkālikam evābhāsayati.12 
 The mental construction (vikalpa) that is, for instance, imaginary construction (mano-
rājyasaṃkalpa), being independent from the activity of perception since it has as its essence 
a mental distraction (vyākṣepa), [“wanders autonomously” (svairacārin) according to 
Utpaladeva’s verse. The compound svairacārin means that] it “wanders” (-cārin = carati), 
[i.e.,] it arises and roams about “with respect to itself [only]” (svaira- = svairaṃ k tvā), [that 
is to say,] while being prompted by itself, without depending on anything else that would 
prompt it – out of freedom (svātantrya). The external manifestation [of objects,] such as 
blue, which consist in internal manifestations, is perfectly spontaneous (naisargika) in the 
[case of imagination]; for this mental construction manifests externally, [i.e.,] in the internal 
organ which is the immaculate mirror of intellect (buddhi), an [object] that resides inside the 
subject13 [and] that, [contrary to a remembered object,] belongs to the time of the [cognition 
itself] (tātkālika) – [for instance,] a white, two-trunked, one-hundred-tusked elephant – al-
though it has never been perceived before. 
2. Imagination as a Path towards Self-recognition 
Why do the Pratyabhijñā philosophers thus emphasize the freedom of imagina-
tion? The reason for this insistence is to be found in the core of their meta-
physics. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta defend a kind of idealism according to 
which whatever we perceive, far from existing independently of consciousness, 
is in fact the mere product of the creativity of a single, all-encompassing con-
sciousness; and they consider that each of us is this infinite consciousness 
constantly engaged in playfully creating the world by manifesting itself in the 
form of an external world (just as when we imagine, our imagining conscious-
ness playfully manifests itself in the form of this or that imaginary object). 
Under these conditions, freeing oneself from the suffering of saṃsāra can be 
12 ĪPV, vol. I, pp. 270–271. 
13 Abhinavagupta often insists on the paradoxical location of the imaginary object. It is both 
internal (insofar as it does not exist at all outside of the consciousness that produces it) and 
external (insofar as consciousness manifests it outside of itself, on the internal organ that is 
the intellect, buddhi, presented as a clear mirror capable of reflecting any object): in order to 
produce the representation of an object instead of remaining just a mere self-awareness, 
consciousness somehow needs to distance itself from the object by projecting it out of itself. 
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nothing but fully realizing one’s identity with this omnipotent consciousness: 
according to them, liberation is nothing but the Recognition (pratyabhijñā) of 
oneself as “the Lord” (īśvara) understood as this absolutely free consciousness. 
Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta therefore consider that imagination – that is, the 
capacity to create mentally at will – is a privileged experience, because in it, all 
sentient beings, however weak or enslaved, experience the absolute freedom and 
creativity which constitute the essence of the universal consciousness, since they 
can conjure up at will entities that have no existence whatsoever outside of them. 
Thus, immediately after the verse stating that imagination is free, Utpaladeva 
adds this verse: 
 ata eva yathābhīṣṭasamullekhāvabhāsanāt / jñānakriye sphuṭe eva siddhe sarvasya 
jīvataḥ //14 
 Precisely for this reason – [that is,] because of this manifestation of a representation 
(samullekha)15 of [an object] as [we] want it [to be] (yathābhīṣṭa), it is [now] established 
that the knowledge and action of each living being is absolutely evident. 
The most ordinary experience of imagination is a possible path towards the 
absolute. However trivial – or rather, precisely because of its triviality –, it is 
capable of bringing about the Recognition that constitutes the supreme goal of 
the treatise,16 since in it, the individual subject knows in the most indubitable 
14 ĪPK I, 6, 11. 
15 Literally, something like an act of “picturing up” (the term is derived from the root –LIKH, 
“to draw”). 
16 See Abhinavagupta’s introduction to this verse in the ĪPV, vol. I, p. 271: asmāc cāntarā-
bhāsasaṃbhavasamarthanaprasaṅgāgatād ābhāsabhedavicārāc chāstre yat prayojanaṃ 
mukhyatayābhisaṃhitaṃ svātmanīśvarapratyabhijñānarūpaṃ tad adhikaraṇasiddhānta-
nītyānāyāsasiddham iti darśayati. “And [Utpaladeva now] shows that thanks to this exami-
nation of the differences [between types of] manifestations that followed from the demon-
stration of the possibility for phenomena [of being] internal, the goal (prayojana) essentially 
pursued in this treatise – namely, the Recognition of the Lord (īśvarapratyabhijñāna) in 
oneself (svātman) – has [just] been established effortlessly, through the use of a conclusion 
[that is the basis for the establishment of another] matter (adhikaraṇasiddhānta).” Cf. ĪPVV, 
vol. II, p. 335: antarābhāsasaṃbhavopapādanaprasaṅgāyātād ābhāsavaicitryavicārāt tad 
apy ayatnasiddhaṃ jātaṃ yatsiddhāv anyaprakaraṇasiddhir ity adhikaraṇasiddhāntalābhād 
yad iha śāstre svātmanīśvararūpatāpratyabhijñopāyaprakaṭīkaraṇaṃ nāma mukhyaṃ 
prayojanam iti nirūpayati sūtreṇa. “Through the examination of the variety of manifesta-
tions undertaken as a result of [our] demonstration of the possibility of internal mani-
festations, the [following] also is now effortlessly established thanks to the obtainment of a 
conclusion [that is the basis for the establishment of another] matter (adhikaraṇasiddhānta), 
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way that he possesses the powers of action and knowledge (kriyā- and 
jñānaśakti) ascribed to Śiva himself by various sources (including non-dualistic 
Śaiva scriptures and Purāṇic stories).17 Thus in his V tti, Utpaladeva goes as far 
as presenting imagination as the very experience of Śiva’s omniscience and 
omnipotence,18 and in his ĪPV, Abhinavagupta explains: 
 yad idaṃ yathābhīṣṭasya bahirasattvād ananubhūtasyāpi samyag ullekhanam avabhāsanaṃ 
ca vikalpasya prasaṅgād darśitam asmād eva hetor idam api siddhyati: yaḥ kaścit kīṭo vā 
brahmā vā jīvanakriyāviṣṭas tasyāvabhāsanarūpā jñānaśaktir ullekhanarūpā ca kriyāśaktir 
naisargikī, tatas tasyāṃ bhūmau vyatirikteśvaropakalpitapūrvasiddhas ṣṭyupajīvana-
saṃbhāvanāpi nāstīti svam evaiśvaryaṃ sphuṭaṃ pratyabhijñeyaṃ jānāti karoti ceti 
jñānakriyāsvātantryalakṣaṇam. ekavacanena sarvasya jīvajātasya vastuta ekeśvararūpatāṃ 
sūcayati.19 
 The mental construction involves a [“samullekha”, i.e.,] a complete (sam- = samyak) act of 
representation (-ullekha = ullekhana) and a manifestation (avabhāsana) of [an object] as 
[we] want [it to be], although [this object] was never experienced [before], because it does 
not exist outside [of the subject’s mind]. For this very reason – expounded as a consequence 
[of our current examination] –, this too is established: the power of knowledge (jñānaśakti) 
(in the form of the manifestation [of the imagined object]) and the power of action 
(kriyāśakti) (in the form of its representation) are spontaneous (naisargikī) for whoever – 
whether a worm or Brahmā – is a [“living being”, i.e.,] is pervaded by the action that is life. 
Therefore, in that realm, one cannot even imagine (-saṃbhāvanāpi nāsti) a dependence with 
respect to the already existing creation that was [supposedly] constructed by a Lord 
separated [from the individual subject]. Therefore it is one’s own sovereignty (svam 
evaiśvaryam) that is “evident” – [i.e.,] that may be recognized (pratyabhijñeya) as con-
sisting in the freedom (svātantrya) to know and act – [a freedom expressed in the verbal 
________________________________ 
in accordance with [the definition formulated in NS I, 1, 30: ‘the adhikaraṇasiddhānta is 
that] the establishment of which leads to the establishment of another matter’: the main goal 
of this treatise – namely, making evident the means (upāya) of a Recognition of the identity 
with the Lord (īśvararūpatāpratyabhijñā) in oneself. This is what [Utpaladeva] explains in 
[the next] verse.”  
17 On Recognition as the synthesis of an abstract knowledge concerning īśvara – contained in 
the Purāṇas, the Āgamas, common knowledge (prasiddhi), etc. – with one’s immediate 
intuition of oneself, and on the fact that this recognition can only be brought about by 
making evident that the individual subject possesses the powers (śakti) traditionally ascribed 
to īśvara, see e.g. RATIÉ 2006, pp. 97–99, and RATIÉ 2007, pp. 360–363. 
18 See V tti ad ĪPK I, 6, 11, p. 31: apūrvārthanirmāṇajñānasāmarthyāc ca vikalpa eva 
sarvasya sarvajñatvaṃ sarvakart tvaṃ ca sphuṭam. “And because of the power to create 
and know objects that are new (apūrva) in the mental construction itself, the omniscience 
(sarvajñatva) and omnipotence (sarvakart tva) of all is evident.” 
19 ĪPV, vol. I, pp. 272–273. 
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forms] “he knows and does”. By using the singular [in “the knowledge and action of each 
living being”, Utpaladeva] suggests that in fact, all living beings without exception consist 
in the unique Lord. 
Abhinavagupta emphasizes once again the freedom (svātantrya) of imagination 
and its paradoxes. Imagination is so free that one cannot even imagine it to be 
dependent on the world of perception; and since it is thus totally independent of 
the perceived universe considered as the creation of the Lord (īśvara) by the 
Śaivas, what imagination reveals is one’s own sovereignty (aiśvarya) – literally, 
the “fact of being the Lord (īśvara)”: because imagination is the freedom of 
consciousness, the individual subject himself must be the absolutely free con-
sciousness that the Śaiva scriptures designate as Śiva. For the individual subject, 
imagination is therefore a means of recovering one’s own identity – of obtaining 
the self-realization or the “Recognition [that one] is the Lord” (īśvarapratya-
bhijñā).20 
20 Cf. the parallel passage in ĪPVV, vol. II, pp. 335–336: bahir atyantāsattvād ananubhūtasya 
samyag ullekhanaṃ *nirmāṇapūrvakaṃ ca [conj. nirmāṇapūrvakaṃ KSTS] yad avabhāsa-
naṃ prasaṅgavaśena darśitam, asmād eva hetoḥ sarvasya brahmāder api kīṭaparyantasya 
vedyarūpadehādyātmamānitayā prāṇadhāraṇavato jīvato jñānam avabhāsanātmakam, kriyā 
ca svollekhanirmāṇarūpā svātantryeṇeti śaktiyugalakam api siddham iti. tad idānīṃ 
suṣṭhutamāṃ d ḍhībhūtaṃ yad avocāma: sarvasyātmā maheśvaro jñānakriyāyogād itīti 
sūtrārthaḥ. “For the very reason – shown as a result [of our reasoning] – that is the [‘sam-
ullekha’, i.e.,] the complete (sam- = samyak) act of representation (-ullekha = ullekhana) of 
an [imaginary object] that had not been experienced [before] – since it has absolutely no 
existence outside [the subject’s imagination] – and the manifestation (avabhāsana) preceded 
by this act of creation (nirmāṇa), ‘knowledge’, which has this manifestation as its essence, 
and ‘action’, which consists in this creation that is a representation in oneself, belong to 
‘each living being’, from Brahmā himself to a worm – [that is,] to anyone endowed with life 
insofar as [he or she] identifies [him- or her-]self as a [particular] body for instance, 
[whereas in fact this body] is an object; [and they thus belong to each living being] as being 
free (svātantryeṇa); so both of these powers are [now] established.  Therefore now, what we 
had [already] stated is made all the more certain – namely that the Self (ātman) of all is the 
Great Lord, because [all] possess [the powers of] knowledge and action. This was the 
[general] meaning of the verse.” Later, as he is commenting on Utpaladeva’s lost Viv ti on 
this verse, Abhinavagupta insists again that imagination is a means of accomplishing Re-
cognition (Ibid., p. 336): yatheti yena prastutaprasaṅgaprakāreṇedam āyātaṃ yat kṣetrajño 
na kevalaṃ sm tyaiva buddhibhūmau vedyatvena bāhyatvenārtham ābhāsayati, yāvat 
svatantravikalpanavyāpāreṇāpīti, tena prasaṅgaprakāreṇa yadartho’yaṃ śāstrārambhodya-
maḥ so’pīśvararūpatāpratyabhijñāpanopāyanirūpaṇakramo’vasito labdhaḥ. katham? āhā-
neneti svatantravikalpanātmakavyāpāraprakāreṇoktenety arthaḥ. “[In the passage of the 
Viv ti beginning with] ‘just as...’, [Utpaladeva explains the following:] from the particular 
 UTPALADEVA AND ABHINAVAGUPTA ON IMAGINATION 349 
AS/EA LXIV•2•2010, S. 341–385 
3. An Objection: 
Imagination Merely Combines Pre-existing Elements 
However, from the point of view of many Indian philosophers, there is an 
obvious objection to this claim that in imagination, the individual subject enjoys 
freedom. Abhinavagupta does not mention it in his ĪPV, but it appears in his 
more detailed ĪPVV: 
 nanu nāsau naisargikas tatrāpi hi tad gavāśvaṃ pūrvānubhavaviṣayīk tam eva vikalpyate.21  
 [– An objector:] But this [imaginary construction] is not spontaneous (naisargika), because 
in this case [of imagination] as well, [and not only in the case of memory for instance,] cows 
and horses, [when imagined,] are mentally constructed only insofar as they have been the 
objects of some past experience! 
Who is this objector? Nothing in the text allows us to conclude that he belongs 
to this or that particular school. However it is worth noting that this argument is 
a topos in the controversy between, on the one hand, the Brahmanical philoso-
phers who believe in the existence of an external world revealed by our per-
ceptions, and on the other hand, the Buddhist Vijñānavādins, according to whom 
the objects of our perceptions have no more reality than the objects of our 
dreams, so that, just as dream objects, perceived objects are not entities existing 
outside of our cognitions but internal aspects taken on by consciousness.22 Thus, 
according to the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, even dream objects necessarily 
have an external substratum (ālambana, pradhāna), because the objects that we 
see in our dreams are in fact nothing but objects that we have perceived in the 
________________________________ 
consequence drawn from the subject at hand, it follows that the individual subject (kṣetra-
jña) manifests the object as external [to his subjectivity, i.e.,] as an object of knowledge, in 
the realm of the intellect, not only through the sole memory (sm ti), but also through an 
activity of mental construction that is free (svatantra); thanks to this particular consequence, 
the goal that prompted [Utpaladeva] to undertake this treatise, [namely,] the progressive 
explanation of the way to bring about the recognition that [one] is the Lord (īśvara-
rūpatāpratyabhijñāpana) is also ‘completed’, [i.e.], obtained. How? [Utpaladeva answers] 
‘by this […]’ – i.e., by this particular activity that [he] has been describing, consisting in a 
free mental construction (svatantravikalpana).” 
21 ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 331. 
22 On dream as a model for the Vijñānavādins’ explanation of perception, see e.g. Vasu-
bandhu’s Viṃśatikā; on the Brahmanical critical interpretations of this “dream-argument”, 
see TABER 1994. 
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past. Dreams are therefore considered as memories – but memories that, because 
of a “defect” (doṣa) due to the state of the body during sleep, are not appre-
hended as such; and because dreams present as actual some objects that were in 
fact experienced in the past, they are considered as belonging to the category of 
errors (bhrānti).23 One could object to such a theory that our dreams sometimes 
show us entities or events that we have never experienced before, so that they 
seem to betray some kind of free power of imagination. 24  The Mīmāṃsaka 
Kumārila answers that these things only seem new to us for the reason that they 
were experienced in some previous life that we have forgotten.25 But dream 
23 See ŚV, Nirālambanavāda, 107cd-108ab: svapnādipratyaye bāhyaṃ sarvathā na hi neṣyate 
// sarvatrālambanaṃ bāhyaṃ deśakālānyathātmakam / “For in a cognition occurring in a 
dream (svapna) or [any other illusion, it is] not [true] that no external object is required at 
all. In every [cognition], there is an external substratum (ālambana), [although] it appears 
differently as regards place and time.” Cf. NR ad loc., p. 174: bāhyam eva deśāntare kālān-
tare vānubhūtam eva svapne smaryamāṇaṃ doṣavaśāt sannihitadeśakālavattayāvagamyate, 
ato’trāpi na bāhyābhāva iti. “In a dream, it is an external [object] that has indeed been 
experienced in another place or time that is remembered (smaryamāṇa). Because of a defect 
(doṣa), it is apprehended as having the actual place and time; as a consequence, even in this 
case [of dreams,] it is not the case that the object is non-existent.” Cf. ŚV, Śūnyavāda, 
159cd-161ab: *atītatvānuviddho [corr.: atītvānuviddho ŚV] hi sm tyā grāhyo’nubhūyate // 
tadvad eva bhaved atra svapne na sgād viparyayāt / tatra hy avartamāno’pi g hyate varta-
mānavat // bādhajñānād idaṃ bhrāntam […]. “For [the object] apprehended by memory 
(sm ti) is experienced as being pervaded by [the property of] being past; in this case it must 
be exactly thus, [but] in a dream (svapna), it is not the case, because of its falseness 
(viparyaya). For in a [dream, the object,] altough it is not present (avartamāna), is appre-
hended as if it were present (vartamānavat); [and] because of the cognition that contradicts 
it [when one wakes up], it is erroneous (bhrānta).” 
24 See e.g. NR, p. 174: nanv ananubhūtam api kvacit svapne’vagamyate! “But sometimes, [an 
object] is apprehended in a dream whereas it has never been experienced before!” 
25 See ŚV, Nirālambanavāda, 108cd-109ab: janmany ekatra bhinne vā tathā kālāntare’pi vā // 
taddeśo vānyadeśo vā svapnajñānasya gocaraḥ / “The dream cognition has as its object 
[something that was perceived] either in some other life or in the same [life but] at another 
time, [and that can be] associated to the place of this [past perception] or to some other 
place.” Cf. NR, p. 174: anantaradivasānubhūtasya svapne varttamānavad avagamāt sm tir 
eva tāvat svapnajñānam iti niścīyate, anyatrāpi sm titvam evāyuktam, tataś cāsmiñ janmany 
ananubhūtasyāpi svapne d śyamānasya janmāntarādāv anubhavaḥ kalpyata iti. “Because 
[we] apprehend in a dream what [we] have [already] experienced the day before as if it were 
happening now, it is established that the dream cognition is nothing but a memory (sm ti). In 
other cases, [the dream] cannot be just a memory, and as a consequence, [we] assume that 
there has [already] been an experience of [the object] perceived in the dream, although it 
was not exerienced in this life – in some other life for instance.” 
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objects do not appear spontaneously: they are “produced by the sole residual 
traces” (saṃskāramātraja) left by previous experiences; 26  and because the 
dreamer does not produce his objects ex nihilo, he only fashions or shapes them, 
but he does not create them in the full sense of the term.27 
For the same reasons, the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā also contend that just as in 
the case of dreams, the so-called creations of imagination are not genuine crea-
tions: imaginary constructions, too, are nothing but the product of a mechanism 
of residual traces, and they are made of elements that were first perceived. Thus 
the NS and their commentaries state that “just as memory (sm ti) or [imaginary] 
construction (saṃkalpa)”, dreams actually concern objects already perceived at 
26 See ŚV, Śūnyavāda, 206 (evaṃ ca naiva vaktavyam atyantābhavanaṃ kvacit / anyathānupa-
pattyā hi siddhā janmāntare’stitā // “And thus, one cannot state the absolute non-existence 
(atyantābhavana) [of the object] in any [circumstance] whatsoever; for the existence (astitā) 
[of the object] is established, [even though only] in another life, because of the impossibility 
[for the cognition] of taking place if it were not the case”), and NR ad loc., p. 233: sva-
pnajñānaṃ tāvat pratyutpannakāraṇābhāvād anantaradivasānubhūtasya ca svapne vartta-
mānavad ābhāsāt saṃskāramātrajaṃ smaraṇam eva, tataś ca yad apy asmiñ janmany 
ananubhūtaṃ svapne’nubhūyate tasyāpy anyathānupapattyā janmāntare’nubhavakalpanāt 
siddham astitvam iti. “As for the dream cognition, it is nothing but a memory (smaraṇam 
eva) produced by the sole residual trace (saṃskāramātraja), because there is no present 
cause [of this cognition], and because in a dream, there is a manifestation of an [object] as if 
it were present, [whereas this object] has been experienced the day before. And as a con-
sequence, [we] have established the existence (astitva) of the [object] that, [although] not 
experienced in this life, is experienced in a dream, for it is assumed that [this object] was 
experienced in some previous life, because of the impossibility [for this cognition] of taking 
place otherwise.” 
27 See ŚV, Śūnyavāda, 210: tasmād bhrāntir api tv eṣāṃ kalpayanty artham eva naḥ / kalpa-
yaty anyathā santaṃ na tv ātmānaṃ vyavasyati // “As a consequence, there is [indeed] an 
error (bhrānti) [in dreams and other illusions]; however, [this error], although fashioning 
(kalpayantī) the object for us, fashions this existing [object] so as to make it different [from 
what it is], but does not determine its very essence (ātman).” Cf. NR ad loc., p. 234: yasmād 
evaṃ sarvatra bāhyam asti tasmād api kalpayantī kalpanārūpāpi sad artham evānyathā 
sthitam anyathā kalpayati, tena ca rūpeṇa vidyamānam eva vidyamānatayā kalpayati na tv 
ātmānaṃ bahiṣṭvena, nātyantāsantaṃ sattveneti. “Since thus, in all cases, there is an exter-
nal [object, the error,] while fashioning an object that exists – [i.e.,] although it consists in a 
mental construction (kalpanā) –, fashions it so as to make it different [from what it is]; and it 
fashions in this form [the object] of which [we] are aware as [the object] of which we are 
aware, but certainly not the very essence (ātman) [of the object] as an external [object] – 
[i.e., it does not construct an object] absolutely non-existent as if it existed.” 
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some point in the past.28 Similarly, Kumārila considers that imaginary objects 
are mere combinations of elements previously perceived: even objects that are 
obviously confined to the realm of imagination – such as one of India’s classical 
examples of non-being: a hare’s horn – are actually entirely made of existing, 
perceived elements.29 
28 See NS IV, 2, 34 (sm tisaṃkalpavac ca svapnaviṣayābhimānaḥ. “And the belief (abhimāna) 
in the dream object [actually regards an object previously perceived,] as in the cases of 
memory (sm ti) and [imaginary] construction (saṃkalpa)”), and NSBh ad loc. (p. 274): 
pūrvopalabdhaviṣayaḥ. yathā sm tiś ca saṃkalpaś ca pūrvopalabdhaviṣayau na tasya 
pratyākhyānāya kalpete, tathā svapne viṣayagrahaṇaṃ pūrvopalabdhaviṣayaṃ na tasya 
pratyākhyānāya kalpata iti. evaṃ d ṣṭaviṣayaś ca svapnānto jāgaritāntena. “[One should 
supply:] ‘regards an object previously perceived’. And just as memory and [imaginary] 
construction regard an object that was previously perceived, [so that] they cannot be used 
for the refutation of [the very existence of] this [object], in the same way, in a dream, the 
apprehension of the object, which regards an object previously perceived, cannot be used for 
the refutation of the [existence of] this [object]. And thus, thanks to the waking state, the 
dream state possesses an object that has been perceived.” Cf. NBhV, p. 490: ye caite 
svapnādipratyayāḥ puravimānodyānayānādibhedānuvidhāyinas te mithyāpratyayā iti 
mithyāpratyayānāṃ ca jāgradavasthāpratyayasāmānyād bhāvaḥ. mamāpi sarva eva mithyā-
pratyayā bhavantīti bruvāṇaḥ pradhānam anuyoktavyaḥ; na niṣpradhānaṃ viparyaya-
pratyeyaṃ paśyāma iti. “And these cognitions in dreams and [other illusions,] which imitate 
(anuvidhāyin) the variegation of a journey through cities, palaces and gardens for instance, 
are false cognitions; and false cognitions have an existence by virtue of their community 
(sāmānya) with the cognitions of the waking state. He who says ‘But for me, all [cognitions] 
without exception are false cognitions!’ must be asked about the substratum (pradhāna) [of 
these false cognitions]; for we do not see any object of a false cognition that would be 
devoid of substratum (niṣpradhāna).” 
29 See e.g. ŚV, Śūnyavāda, 111cd-112ab, where, having shown that all perceptual illusions, far 
from arising ex nihilo, have an external object as their substratum, Kumārila adds: 
dravyāntare viṣāṇaṃ ca śaśasyātmā ca kāraṇam // śaśaś ṅgadhiyo mauṇḍyaṃ niṣedhe 
śiraso’sya ca / “And the cause of the cognition of a hare’s horn is a horn [that was per-
ceived] in some other individual substance [such as a cow], and the nature of a hare [also 
perceived in the past]; and [the cause] of the negation [of the existence of a hare’s horn] is 
the [perceived] baldness of the [hare]’s head.” 
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4. Utpaladeva’s First Element of Answer: 
The Combination itself is Spontaneous 
Here is how, according to Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva was answering this ob-
jection in his lost Viv ti: 
 iti codye nirūpayati yatheti: śvetaṃ dantadaśakākīrṇakaratrayakalitavadanaṃ dantinam 
antaḥ pramāt bhūmau sthitaṃ svacchabuddhimakuralakṣaṇe bāhyagocare vikalpas tātkāli-
kam ābhāsayati svecchānusāreṇeti *saṃsthānayojanāṃśe na [corr.: saṃsthānayojanāṃśena 
KSTS]30 asyānubhavānusāritvam ity asti naisargiko’sau.31 
 [As an answer] to this objection, [Utpaladeva] explains, [in the passage of the Viv ti 
beginning with] “just as...”, that the mental construction [that belongs to imagination] mani-
fests in the external realm consisting in the immaculate mirror of the intellect, according to 
the will of the [subject], a white elephant that has a ten-tusked, three-trunked head, that 
resides “internally” – [i.e.,] inside the subject, [and that] belongs to the time of the 
[cognition itself] (tātkālika). Therefore the fact that this [mental construction] conforms to 
some [past] experiences does not concern the aspect of combination (yojanā) of this con-
figuration; so this [mental construction] is indeed spontaneous (naisargika)! 
Abhinavagupta’s playful variations on the theme of the fantastic elephant are a 
perfect illustration of Utpaladeva’s argument here: even if one admits that 
imaginary constructions are made of elements entirely borrowed from the 
domain of perception, and that imagination merely combines differently these 
elements, this very activity of combination (yojanā) is absolutely free. There 
seems to be no limit in our power to associate various elements formerly 
perceived and to thus create entities – be they hare’s horns or ten-tusked, three-
trunked elephants – that are absolutely alien to the world of perception; and this 
activity of combination is not determined in any way by residual traces left by 
previous experiences, since nobody has ever experienced the configurations of 
which we are capable. 
30 This correction had already been proposed in TORELLA 2002, fn. 23, p. 135. 
31 ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 332. 
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5. Utpaladeva’s Second Element of Answer: 
Even the Combined Elements are Freely Created 
At the end of his ĪPVV commentary on verse I, 6, 9, Abhinavagupta was already 
summing up the Pratyabhijñā’s position on the extent of imagination’s freedom 
by distinguishing the two “aspects” (aṃśa) of imaginary construction – namely, 
on the one hand, the combination (yojanā), and on the other hand, the elements 
that are combined (yojamāna): 
 sa naisargika eveti vakṣyamāṇasūtrayoḥ svatantravikalpeṣu vikalpanīyārthānāṃ yojanāṃśe 
paśoḥ svātantryaṃ vakṣyate, na tu yojyamānāṃśe, na hy ananubhūtaṃ jalaṃ jvalanaṃ ca 
yojayet kaścid iti.32 
 In the following two verses beginning with “[the mental construction] is perfectly spon-
taneous […]”,33 [Utpaladeva] is going to state the freedom (svātantrya) of the alienated 
subject (paśu) in the mental constructions that are free, as regards the aspect of combination 
(yojanā) of the objects elaborated in the mental construction, but not as regards the aspect of 
the combined [elements] (yojyamāna); for nobody can combine water and fire [through 
imagination if] they have not been experienced [first]. 
However, Utpaladeva does not content himself with stating that imagination is a 
free power of combining perceived elements. He goes one step further, as 
Abhinavagupta emphasizes while commenting on verse I, 6, 10 in the ĪPVV: 
 nāstīti yojyamāno’pi bhāgaḥ pūrvakālāparāmarśād anubhavānupajīvy eva.34 
 [In the passage of the Viv ti beginning with] “there is no […]”, [Utpaladeva explains that] 
even the aspect that is combined does not depend on any [previous] experience, because 
there is no grasp (parāmarśa) of the past time [when it was first perceived]. 
One thing is clear: according to Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva was stating in his 
lost Viv ti that ultimately, the activity of combination is not the only autonomous 
aspect of imagination, since even the elements combined are in fact independent 
of the previous experience during which the imagining subject has perceived 
them. Much less clear, however, is the reason invoked to demonstrate this point: 
“because there is no grasp of the previous time [when it was perceived].” Does 
Utpaladeva simply mean that the elements forming the imagined object are 
independent of perception because we don’t remember having perceived them at 
32 ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 331. 
33 ĪPK I, 6, 10 and 11, quoted above. 
34 ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 332. 
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this or that particular moment of our past? If such is his argument, it is rather 
weak; for if we imagine something like Abhinavagupta’s fantastic elephant, the 
fact that we do not remember having seen a tusk in this or that particular circum-
stance in the past does not make us less dependent on the previous experience 
through which we first discovered what a tusk looks like – the fact that we have 
forgotten it does not make it less of a determining factor in the result of our 
mental construction. But if Utpaladeva does not mean this, what else can he 
mean? In his V tti on the same verse, he apparently alludes to the same rather 
mysterious argument: 
 svatantras tu vikalpaś cakṣurādyagocaram api buddhiviṣayatāpādanena yathāruci pūrvānu-
bhūtatvāvimarśanena navam eva taṃ tam artham ābhāsayati saṃniveśaviśeṣaṃ ca. tatrāsāv 
arthaḥ sahaja evāsti.35 
 However, the free mental construction manifests this or that object, which is new (navam 
eva) – because there is no grasp (vimarśa) [of it] as having been experienced in the past – 
and which has a particular organization [of its parts], at will, by making it the object of the 
intellect although it does not belong to the field of the organs of sight, etc. In this [kind of 
free mental construction], the object is produced simultaneously [with the cognition].36 
What exactly does Utpaladeva mean when he insists that the imagined object 
(including its parts, as Abhinavagupta specifies in the ĪPVV) is new (nava)? The 
point is somewhat subtle and requires a small digression into the Pratyabhijñā 
theory of perception. This little détour is worthwhile because it will enable us to 
reach the core of Utpaladeva’s theory of imagination. 
35 V tti, p. 30. 
36 Here my understanding of the V tti slightly differs from that of R. Torella in his remarkable 
edition and annotated translation of this text. First, I believe that here, the ca connecting 
navam eva taṃ tam artham and saṃniveśaviśeṣaṃ should not be understood as a sort of 
disjunction (cf. TORELLA 2002, p. 135: “however, the independent (svatantraḥ) vikalpa ren-
ders this or that thing manifest, whether new or characterized by a different organization of 
its parts […]”), because here as in the lost passage of the Viv ti commented upon by 
Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva is stating that the imaginary object is both made of elements 
previously perceived and new. Besides, it seems to me that in the last sentence, sahaja does 
not mean “spontaneous” (see ibid.), but “simultaneous” (cf. the equivalent term tātkālika 
that so often recurs in Abhinavagupta’s commentaries: see e.g. ĪPV, vol. I, pp. 270–271 and 
ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 331, quoted above, or ĪPVV, vol. II, pp. 333–334, quoted below), because 
Utpaladeva does not mean here that the object is as “free” or “autonomous” (svatantra) as 
the cognition, but rather, that it is new, since it arises at the very moment of the cognition 
that constructs it (contrary to the object of memory for instance). 
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According to the Buddhist logicians who are Utpaladeva and Abhinava-
gupta’s main opponents (and from whom the Pratyabhijñā philosophers borrow 
a number of important concepts),37 when perceiving, we are aware of an entity 
that is absolutely singular (svalakṣaṇa) and, consequently, impossible to for-
mulate (for language can only denote what is common to several entities). In 
contrast, mental construction (vikalpa), which is profoundly linked with lan-
guage (abhilāpa), has as its object a generality (sāmānya):38 when we think “this 
is a pot” upon seeing something, we have already left the mere awareness of a 
singular presence and started constructing the object as belonging to the general 
category of “pots” (whereby we have already ceased to be aware of the object’s 
absolute singularity). The Pratyabhijñā philosophers invert this scheme.39 Ac-
cording to them, the object of perception is indeed a singular entity, but this 
singular entity is not the primary matter on which the mental construction then 
elaborates a generality; on the contrary, this singular object is in fact a synthesis 
of elementary phenomena (ābhāsa) that can be considered as generalities 
(sāmānya). Thus this particular pot seen here and now is in fact made of a series 
of elementary phenomena (such as “this”, “pot”, “red”, “made of gold”, etc.); 
contrary to the singular entities in which they are found, these elementary pheno-
mena are not restricted to any particular time or place, and for that reason, they 
act as generalities.40 Although made of these, the pot has a unity of its own and 
37 On the somewhat ambiguous relation between the Pratyabhijñā and the Buddhist logic and 
epistemology, see TORELLA 1992. 
38 See e.g. the beginning of the Buddhist’s discourse as presented by Utpaladeva in ĪPK I, 2, 1: 
nanu svalakṣaṇābhāsaṃ jñānam ekaṃ paraṃ punaḥ / sābhilāpaṃ vikalpākhyaṃ bahudhā 
[…] “But one [type of] cognition comprises the manifestation of a singular entity (sva-
lakṣaṇa), whereas the other, called ‘mental construction’ (vikalpa), is accompanied by lan-
guage (abhilāpa) [and] manifold”. Cf. RATIÉ 2006, pp. 41–43. 
39 On this inversion, see TORELLA 1992, pp. 332–333, and TORELLA 2002, fn. 3, pp. 89–90. 
40 Thus, while explaining ĪPK II, 3, 2cd (ekābhidhānaviṣaye mitir vastuny abādhitā // “[Valid] 
knowledge, which is not contradicted [by another cognition,] regards an [entity] that is the 
object of a single expression”), Abhinavagupta explains (ĪPV, vol. II, pp. 69–71): vimar-
śabalena ca yataḥ pramāṇaṃ vimarśaś ca śabdajīvitaḥ śabdaś cābhāsāntarair deśakālā-
dirūpair anām ṣṭa ekatraivābhāsamātre pravartate ghaṭa iti lohita iti, tato deśakālā-
bhāsayoḥ svalakṣaṇatvārpaṇapravaṇayor anāmiśraṇāt sāmānyāyamāna ābhāse pramāṇaṃ 
pravartate, ayam ity api hy avabhāsa ābhāsāntarānāmiśre puro’vasthitāvabhāsamātra ity  
uktaṃ śrīmadācāryapādair eva: niyate’py ayam ity evaṃ parāmarśaḥ puraḥsthite / sarva-
bhāvagatedantāsāmānyenaiva jāyate // iti. “And the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) occurs 
thanks to a grasp (vimarśa), and this grasp has as its essence the word; and the word applies 
to one single phenomenon (ābhāsa), as ‘pot’ or ‘red’, etc., that is not grasped along with 
other phenomena consisting in a place, a time, etc. For this reason – i.e., because of the 
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transcends the mere collection of its elements, because it is apprehended as 
unique and unitary by the subject:41 perception is not the passive reflection of 
some given reality, but an active apprehension, realization or grasp (vimarśa) in 
________________________________ 
absence of a combination with the phenomena of place and time that may give [the object] 
its singularity (svalakṣaṇatva), the means of knowledge operates on a phenomenon that 
behaves as a generality (sāmānyāyamāna); for even ‘this’ expresses a manifestation that is 
not combined with other phenomena, [and] that is nothing but the manifestation standing 
right in front [of the subject]. This has been said by the venerable master himself: ‘even the 
grasp (parāmarśa) as this, which concerns a determined [object] standing right in front [of 
the subject,] arises thanks to the sole generality (sāmānya) that is objectivity (idantā) [and] 
that is found in all objects’.”  
41 This “grasp” (vimarśa) of the object’s singularity is in turn made possible by the fact that 
when combined, the elementary phenomena have a common efficacy (arthakriyā), pro-
ducing a single effect on the subject who perceives them. See ĪPK II, 3, 7: p thagdīpa-
prakāśānāṃ srotasāṃ sāgare yathā / aviruddhāvabhāsānām ekakāryā tathaikyadhīḥ // “Just 
as the cognition of the unity of the distinct light rays of a lamp, [and just as the cognition of 
the unity] of rivers in the ocean, [the cognition of the unity] of phenomena (avabhāsa) that 
are not [mutually] contradicted must be produced by a unitary [entity] (ekakāryā).” In his 
commentary, Abhinavagupta explains that the rays of a lamp are apprehended as con-
stituting together a singular entity because when they are gathered, they have an efficacy 
that they don’t have separately and that is not the mere collection of their respective indi-
vidual efficacies (ĪPV, vol. II, p. 97: p thag vartinyo yāḥ pradīpasya prabhāḥ sūkṣmatamā 
avalokanasāmarthyādhānalakṣaṇāṃ yām arthakriyāṃ na k tavatyas tām evaikabhavanā-
bhyantaraṃ saṃmūrchitātmāno vidadhate, na tatrārthakriyāṇāṃ samudāyo’sti. sāgara-
patitāni ca srotāṃsi bahutarataraṅgāraṃbhārthakriyākārīṇi. “The light rays of a lamp 
which, when appearing separately (p thak), do not have the efficacy (arthakriyā) consisting 
in enabling to see – [because then they are] very subtle –, do have this [efficacy] when they 
are concentrated (saṃmūrchita) in the same place; [and] in that case, it is not a collection 
(samudāya) of [various] efficacies[, but a unique efficacy]. And [in the same way,] the 
rivers flowing into the ocean have as their [common] efficacy to move countless waves”). 
Similarly, one apprehends a singular object (svalakṣaṇa) because of a combination of 
elementary phenomena that acquire together a unitary efficacy; cf. ĪPV, vol. II, pp. 98–99: 
p thag ye dīpaprakāśās teṣāṃ saṃbandhi yad ekaṃ sāgare srotasāṃ ca yad ekaṃ vastu 
tena kāryā yathaikyadhīs tathāviruddhā ye’vabhāsā ghaṭalohitakāñcanādayas teṣāṃ 
saṃbandhi yad ekaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ tatkāryaikyadhīḥ. “Just as the cognition of a unity must 
be produced [in the case of light] by a unitary (eka) [entity] that possesses the distinct rays 
of the lamp, and in the case of the ocean, by the unitary entity that possesses the rivers – in 
the same way, [in the case of the perception of a particular pot,] the cognition of unity must 
be produced by a unitary (eka) singular [entity] (svalakṣaṇa) that possesses [various] 
phenomena (avabhāsa) that are not contadictory, such as ‘pot’, ‘red’, ‘made of gold’, etc.” 
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which the subject synthesizes these elements and becomes aware of them as 
being part of a singular entity.42 
In this regard, the Pratyabhijñā philosophers concede that the activity of 
imagination is not, properly speaking, a creation ex nihilo: however free in his 
activity of combination, the imagining subject has to rely on elements that are 
precisely the “elementary phenomena” (ābhāsa) of which any singular perceived 
entity is made, because just as any perceived object, an imaginary object is a 
singular entity made of generalities. Thus, much further in the treatise, Abhi-
navagupta insists very clearly on this dependence: 
 pañcavaktraś caturdanto hastī nabhasi dhāvatīty api vimiśratayā vikalpas ṣṭis tān ābhāsān 
īśvaras ṣṭān evopajīvatīti sarvā pāśavī pratyayas ṣṭir īśvaras ṣṭyupajīvinīty uktam.43 
 Even the creation that is a mental construction (vikalpas ṣṭi) in the form of a combination 
(vimiśra) [such as] “a five-trunked, four-tusked elephant is running in the sky” depends on 
some phenomena (ābhāsa) that for their part have been created by the Lord; therefore 
[Utpaladeva] says that any cognitive creation of the alienated subject (paśu) depends 
(upajīvinī) on the Lord’s creation. 
The freedom of the imagining subject finds its limit in the elements that he 
combines: ultimately, his creation remains heteronomous insofar as it still de-
pends on the elementary phenomena that he must borrow from past percep-
tions.44 The same remark is found in Abhinavagupta’s commentary on verse I, 6, 
10: 
 gatasya yo’vabhāso nāsau pūrvānubhūtaḥ. tatraiva tu vikalpe yo yojyamānarūpaḥ sāmā-
nyāṃśaḥ, sa nāpūrvo, na hi ca vikalpas tatrāṃśe svatantro’nubhavavāsanopajīvitvād iti.45 
 The manifestation of [a particular imagined] pot has never been experienced before; but 
within this same mental construction, the aspect of generality (sāmānya) that consists in the 
combined [elements] (yojyamāna) is not new, because the construction is not free (sva-
42 On the fact that, according to the Pratyabhijñā philosophers, perception does not passively 
reflect its objects but becomes aware of them in an act of apprehension or grasp (vimarśa, 
parāmarśa, etc.) that constitutes the very essence of consciousness, see ĪPK I, 5, 11 and its 
commentaries; cf. e.g. HULIN 1978, pp. 287–297,  RATIÉ 2006, p. 87, fn. 138, and RATIÉ 
2007, pp. 339–340, fn. 59; on the meaning of vimarśa and other terms deriving from the 
same root, see also TORELLA 2002, fn. 32, p. XXIV. 
43 ĪPV, vol. II, pp. 264–265.  
44 Cf. ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 381: daśaradano dantīty api p thagābhāsān īśvaras ṣṭān evopajīvati. 
“Even [this creation of the alienated subject]: ‘a ten-tusked elephant’, depends on distinct 
phenomena that for their part are produced by the Lord.” 
45 ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 335. 
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tantra) as regards this aspect, since it depends on the impregnations (vāsanā) left by 
[former] experiences. 
And yet, in spite of this acknowledgment that the elementary phenomena at least 
are not new, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta keep repeating that the imagined 
object made of them is new (nava), unprecedented (apūrva) or simultaneous 
(sahaja, tātkālika) with the imagining cognition that manifests it.46 Besides, as 
we have seen, Utpaladeva states that the imagined object is new “because there 
is no grasp (vimarśa) [of it] as having been experienced in the past”, and in the 
somewhat puzzling passage of the ĪPVV already mentioned, Abhinavagupta 
goes as far as to say that “even the aspect that is combined does not depend on 
any [previous] experience, because there is no grasp (parāmarśa) of the past 
time [when it was first perceived].” What does it mean? 
In order to reconcile these apparently contradictory statements, we should 
bear in mind that according to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, a singular object 
that is perceived is something over and above the mere collection (samudāya) of 
its components, because the elementary phenomena in it have together a single, 
unitary and unique effect on the subject that perceives this object, so that they 
become a single, unitary and unique entity.47 In the same way, the imagined 
46 The importance of this notion of newness as regards imagination can also be found in 
Abhinavagupta’s works on poetics when he describes the poet’s creative inspiration 
(pratibhā): thus, in his commentary on DhĀ I, 6, Abhinavagupta states that pratibhā is “an 
intuitive understanding capable of creating something unprecedented” (apūrvavastu-
nirmāṇakṣamā prajñā; cf. SHULMAN 2008, p. 483). The Sanskrit notion of pratibhā is 
sometimes taken to be “the exact equivalent of Imagination” (see e.g. SREEKANTAIYA 1980, 
p. 11), but as D. Shulman notices, “there are […] other well known Sanskrit candidates for 
this conceptual slot – kalpanā, vikalpa, bhāvanā, sambhāvanā, among others, all firmly 
situated within specific intellectual and theoretical contexts, each carrying its particular 
valence” (SHULMAN 2008, p. 482), and pratibhā is “often more in relation to what we might 
call ‘inspiration’ than to the imagination proper”, although “the visionary capacity of the 
poet’s mind is clearly involved” (Ibid., p. 483). D. Shulman’s article thus explores several 
definitions of it while taking into account this fundamental ambiguity. 
47 See above, fn. 41. Of course, this does not mean that this singular synthesis would be contra-
dictory with the apprehension of this or that particular elementary phenomenon within a 
singular entity: Utpaladeva insists that the perceiving subject is free to distinguish this or 
that general feature within a singular whole. See ĪPK II, 3, 3: yathāruci yathārthitvaṃ 
yathāvyutpatti bhidyate / ābhāso’py artha ekasminn anusaṃdhānasādhite // “In an object 
that is one (eka), [because it is] established through a synthesis (anusaṃdhāna), an [elemen-
tary] phenomenon (ābhāsa) can also be distinguished according to [the subject’s] free will 
(ruci), a [particular] desire (arthitva), [or] according to education (vyutpatti).” Cf. Abhi-
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object transcends the mere collection of elementary phenomena of which it is 
made insofar as it is apprehended as an organic unity by the subject who be-
comes aware of it in a single unitary realization: because the subject becomes 
aware of components such as trunks, tusks, an elephant’s body, etc., through a 
single cognitive act that fuses them together, even these various phenomena, 
although they have already been experienced in the past, are transfigured by the 
synthetic grasp (vimarśa) that apprehends them as parts of this singular elephant 
imagined now. Not only is the fantastic elephant new insofar as no such com-
bination exists in the perceived world, but even the combined parts undergo a 
profound metamorphosis by being merged into a singular entity, and it is this 
singularity that makes the imaginary object genuinely new, in spite of the fact 
that it comprises elements borrowed from previous perceptions. Thus, when an 
objector asks: “But if, in this aspect [of combined elements, the imaginary 
object] is produced by the residual traces of some previous experiences, then 
what else [is left in it] that would be spontaneous (naisargika)?”,48 according to 
Abhinavagupta, “[Utpaladeva] answers: ‘the singular [entity] (svalakṣaṇa)’.”49 
________________________________ 
navagupta’s explanation of ĪPK II, 3, 5 in ĪPV, vol. II, pp. 91–92, according to which the 
subject can distinguish in a particular concrete pot various elementary phenomena such as 
“‘existent’, ‘pot’, ‘substance’, ‘being made of gold’, ‘brilliance’, etc.” (sadghaṭadravya-
kāñcanojjvalatādayaḥ): tathā hi kiṃcid apy atra nāstīti h dbhaṅgam ivāpadyamāno ghaṭaṃ 
paśyann astīdam iti sattvābhāsam eva paśyaty aparān ābhāsān nāmnāpi tu nādriyate; 
tathodakāharaṇārthī ghaṭābhāsam, svatantranayanānayanayogyavastvarthī dravyābhāsam, 
mūlyādyarthī *kāñcanābhāsam [J, P, S2: kāñcanāvabhāsam KSTS, Bhāskarī, L, S1, SOAS], 
h dyatārthy aujjvalyābhāsam, ādigrahaṇād d ḍhatarabhāvārthī dārḍhyābhāsam iti draṣṭa-
vyam; evaṃ rucivyutpattyor api yojanīyam. “To explain: when seeing a pot, [someone] 
whose heart has just been broken as it were [because of the thought:] ‘there is absolutely 
nothing here!’ only sees the phenomenon ‘existence’, [thinking:] ‘this exists!’; but he does 
not pay any attention whatsoever to the other phenomena. In the same way, someone who is 
driven by the desire to go fetch some water [only sees] the phenomenon ‘pot’; someone who 
desires something capable of being freely carried here and there [only sees] the phenomenon 
‘substance’; someone who desires an object of value, etc., [only sees] the phenomenon 
‘made of gold’; someone who desires some kind of aesthetic pleasure (h dyatā) [only sees] 
the phenomenon ‘brilliance’; and because of the use of the word ‘etc.’, [we] must consider 
that [Utpaladeva includes this too:] someone who desires a very hard object [only sees] the 
phenomenon ‘hardness’. And [these examples] must also be put in relation in the same way 
with the [subject’s] free will (ruci) and education (vyutpatti) [mentioned in verse II, 3, 3].” 
48 ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 333: nanu yady atrāṃśe pūrvānubhavasaṃskārajatvam, kim anyat tarhi 
naisargikam? 
49 Ibid.: āha svalakṣaṇa iti. Here too, similarities can be found with alaṃkāra literature. See 
e.g. SHULMAN 2008, p. 492: “For Mahima Bhaṭṭa pratibhā has features of directness, of 
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The power of synthesis (yojanā) in imagination is such that it has a profound 
effect on the combined (yojyamāna) elements themselves: just as the singular 
entity produced by the mental construction is apprehended as new by the 
creating subject, its parts too appear as if they were seen for the first time – and 
indeed, they are seen for the first time insofar as they belong to this singular 
entity. 
When answering the question “how free is imagination?”, the Pratyabhijñā 
philosophers therefore seem to stretch in every possible way the limits of this 
faculty’s freedom. Thus, towards the very end of his ĪPVV commentary on verse 
I, 6, 10, Abhinavagupta remarks that in the Pratyabhijñā’s perspective, the indi-
vidual subject is actually the absolute consciousness that creates the universe 
(including all the elementary phenomena that compose each and every singular 
entity) – only, the individual subject is this absolute consciousness insofar as it is 
imagining itself as being a limited consciousness. Such a principle renders null 
and void the theory according to which imagination is a mere combination of 
formerly perceived external elements – because nothing is external to the all-
encompassing universal consciousness, and because this consciousness creates 
everything anew at every single moment: 
 ābhāsasāre hi padārthavarga ābhāsanakriyaiva prādhānyena vij mbhate, tata eva kriyā-
śaktivisphāramātraṃ bhagavato jagad iti k tamatayo manyante. ābhāsanakriyā ca yāvad 
apūrvā naisargikī vyavadhānavandhyā tātkālikatāliṅgitasphuṭabhāvā vartate, tāvad 
ābhāso’pi sphuṭo’bhinava eva. ghaṭasyāpīhettham eva navatā, nānyatheti darśitam etat. ata 
eva pūrvad ṣṭābhāsamukhena na kutracit paramārthato nirmāṇasaṃkathā sāvakāśā, prakā-
śarūpatayā sarvasya sadaiva svayam eva paramārthasattve kasyacin nirmāṇam ity 
avakāśābhāvād ābhāsanakriyāmukhena tv apūrvatvaṃ kulagiriprabh ter api pratikṣaṇam 
aviśrānta  iti kathitayuktyā bhavatīti tad api s jyata eveti sadās ṣṭyādiśaktiyogo’pi bhaga-
vati na nopapadyata iti tātparyam.50 
 For since all things have as their essence manifestation (ābhāsa), it is the action of mani-
festing (ābhāsanakriyā) which unfolds51 as the substance [of the universe]; for this very 
________________________________ 
dynamism, and above all of singularity, the foregrounding of the distinctive (viśiṣṭa) and 
intrinsic (svabhāva) feature of the object […]. A notion of singularity is fundamental to 
much of Sanskrit poetics, especially in the Kashmiri school; we can trace a connection be-
tween such a notion and the problem of creative perception – or indeed, of imagination.” Cf. 
SHULMAN forthcoming, which emphasizes that the dhvani-theory of Ānandavardhana on 
which Abhinavagupta has commented is not only – as is often noticed – an aesthetics of the 
universal, but also, in some deeper way, an aesthetics of singularity. 
50 ĪPVV, vol. II, pp. 333–334. 
51 Literally, “yawns” – Abhinavagupta often has recourse to this image. 
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reason, the world is nothing but the throbbing shining forth (visphāra) of the Lord’s power 
of action (kriyāśakti) – those who have made up their minds [as regards the ultimate reality] 
know that. And insofar as the action of manifesting occurs while being [ever] new (apūrva), 
spontaneous (naisargikī), immediate,52 and while having an object that is vivid and com-
pletely simultaneous (tātkālika) [with the cognition that manifests it], the [elementary] 
phenomenon also is vivid [and] new (abhinava eva). In this regard, even the pot [that is 
perceived] is new (nava) in this way only, and not otherwise – [we] have [already] shown 
this. For this very reason, in reality, there is no room whatsoever for this tale according to 
which [imagination] would be a creation through some phenomena that have already been 
perceived: because everything consists in the manifesting consciousness (prakāśa), any-
body’s creation is always (sadaiva) absolutely spontaneous (svayam eva) with respect to 
what is real in the ultimate sense of the term (paramārthasattva). Because [thus] there is no 
room [for the contention that imagination only combines pre-existing phenomena,] on the 
contrary, [we must think that] through the action of manifesting, at every single moment 
(pratikṣaṇam), [even] the chief mountain ranges, etc., are new (apūrva), according to the 
reasoning expressed [by Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa in] “without ever resting”.53 Therefore even this 
[aspect consisting in the various elementary phenomena] is created [by the constant activity 
of the Lord]; [and] as a consequence, even possessing the powers of constantly creating 
(s ṣṭi) and [performing the four other cosmic acts attributed to Śiva]54 is not impossible as 
regards the Lord – this was the general meaning.  
52 Literally, “devoid of any intermediary (vyavadhāna)” – as opposed to what happens in cog-
nitions such as memory, fancy or determination, which are determined by the “inter-
mediary” (vyavadhāna) that is a residual trace (saṃskāra) left by some past experience. The 
presence or the absence of such an intermediary determines whether the object appears as 
vivid (sphuṭa) or not; see ĪPV, vol. I, p. 268: etad evāsphuṭatvam iti siddho’nubhava-
smaraṇādāv ābhāsabhedo’ntarābhāsavargasya bahirābhāsanam avyavadhānena sphuṭatā, 
vyavadhānena tu tātkālikatvābhāvād asphuṭateti. “And [having an intermediary] is nothing 
but not being vivid (asphuṭatva); so the difference between manifestations [occurring] in 
direct experience, memory, etc. is established: the manifestation in an external form of a 
multitude of internal manifestations without any intermediary (vyavadhāna) is vividness 
(sphuṭatā); whereas [the manifestation occurring] through the intermediary [of a residual 
trace] – due to the fact that [the manifested object] does not exist simultaneously (tātkāli-
katva) [with the cognition itself] – is the absence of vividness.” 
53 See SC 112: muhur muhur aviśrāntas trailokyaṃ kalpanāśataiḥ / kalpayann’api ko’py eko 
nirvikalpo jayaty ajaḥ // “Glory to the unique Unborn (aja) who is devoid of mental con-
structions (nirvkikalpa) although he is constantly engaged in constructing (kalpayan) the 
Three Worlds through innumerable imaginary acts (kalpanā) without ever resting.” Abhina-
vagupta seems to be particularly fond of this verse: he also quotes it e.g. in his commentary 
on ĪPK I, 5, 10 (ĪPV, vol. I, p. 195) or on I, 6, 7 (ĪPV, vol. I, p. 262). 
54 I.e., maintaining (sthiti) the universe, destroying (saṃhāra, pralaya) it, concealing (tiro-
dhāna) his own nature and revealing it through grace (anugraha). See e.g. ĪPV, vol. I, p. 
262: tena na kevalaṃ mahās ṣṭiṣu mahāsthitiṣu mahāpralayeṣu prakopatirodhāneṣu dīkṣā-
jñānādyanugraheṣu bhagavataḥ k tyapañcakayogaḥ yāvat satatam eva vyavahāre’pi. 
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Abhinavagupta is now inverting the analogy at the basis of the Pratyabhijñā’s 
inquiry on imagination: not only is the individual subject who imagines similar 
to the absolutely free universal consciousness; the absolutely free universal con-
sciousness engaged in a constant activity of cosmic creation is also similar to the 
imagining subject – and this mutual reflection is possible because they are pro-
foundly identical. We are once again back to the metaphysical background on 
which the Pratyabhijñā’s theory of imagination is built; and the passage reveals a 
crucial difference between the theories of imagination (and their metaphysical 
backgrounds) in the Pratyabhijñā, the Advaita Vedānta and the Buddhist logico-
epistemological school. 
Thus according to the Advaita Vedānta, the phenomenal world, with its 
countless differences and constant changes, is the result of an activity of mental 
construction (kalpanā) that builds it due to some kind of metaphysical ignorance 
or nescience (avidyā) in which the knowledge of the absolutely non-dual reality 
is somehow obliterated. From this point of view, the Pratyabhijñā does not seem 
to hold a very different position: according to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta 
too, the world can be considered as the product of an imaginative activity. Simi-
larly, Dharmakīrti and his followers hold that the world of mundane experience 
(vyavahāra) is made of mental constructions (vikalpa). 
However, for the Buddhist epistemologists, if mental elaborations are 
“free”, they are not so in the same sense as in the Pratyabhijñā: according to 
Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, they are autonomous insofar as the subject who 
owns them is free to produce them, whereas according to Dharmakīrti, they are 
autonomous insofar as they do not belong to any subject.55 The Buddhist epi-
________________________________ 
“Therefore the Lord does not perform the five [cosmic] acts (k tyapañcaka) only in great 
creations (mahās ṣṭi), great maintainings (mahāsthiti), great destructions (mahāpralaya), 
concealments (tirodhāna) due to his wrath and graces (anugraha) [bestowed] through initia-
tion, knowledge, etc.; rather, [he is] constantly [performing it], even in mundane activity 
(vyavahāra).” 
55 Utpaladeva was obviously emphasizing this difference in his lost Viv ti. See e.g. ĪPVV ad I, 
6, 10, vol. II, p. 331: nanu saugatavat kim iha vikalpa eva svatantro yena v ttau tathoktam? 
iti bhrāntiṃ nirasyati kṣetrajña ity ādinā. “But in this regard, is it the mental construction 
itself (vikalpa eva) that is free (svatantra), as the Buddhists [contend] (saugatavat), so that 
[Utpaladeva] states in the V tti that [the mental construction] is thus [free, instead of saying 
that the subject is free]?’ [Utpaladeva] refutes this error in [the passage] beginning with ‘the 
subject […]’.” A bit further, Abhinavagupta explains that the vikalpa is free insofar as in it, 
the subject is not determined by anyone or anything else (and not, as the Buddhists contend, 
because it would not belong to any subject). See Ibid.: prācyānubhavaviṣayīk tavastugata-
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stemologists hold that consciousness is in fact a series of momentary conscious 
events irreducibly distinct from one another and they refuse to acknowledge the 
existence of any permanent subject who would be the substratum of these 
cognitions.56 Thus, while they do consider that our everyday world is entirely 
shaped by abstract representations projected onto a singular reality, they see this 
transcendental imagination as totally impersonal; and while the Pratyabhijñā 
philosophers present it as the expression of a conscious agent’s free will, the 
Vijñānavādins consider it as an unconscious and uncontrolled mechanism of 
residual traces comparable to that of dreams (svapna).57 This predilection for the 
dream model is significant, since contrary to the imagining subject, the dreaming 
subject does not experience his creative freedom: he is as it were the victim of an 
imagination that is not his, since usually (that is, if he is not a yogin) he is not 
free to decide what should happen in his dreams. 
For the Vedāntins, quite similarly, the transcendental activity of imagina-
tion which produces the empirical world does not belong to anyone,58 since the 
only reality, the brahman, is absolutely non-dual and alien to any kind of multi-
plicity and change, so that it cannot act or create. This is unacceptable to Abhi-
navagupta. Thus, in another part of the treatise, he questions a Vedāntin in the 
following way: if the only reality is completely quiescent and one, and if 
difference is due to nescience (avidyā), to whom does this nescience belong 
(kasyāvidyā)?59 And to whom does the activity of imaginary construction belong 
________________________________ 
deśakālapramātrantarasācivyādipāratantryaparākaraṇapravaṇeyam uktir iti yāvat. “This is 
what [Utpaladeva means]: this expression [in the V tti, ‘the mental construction is free’, 
only] leads to setting aside the heteronomy (pāratantrya) [that could be due] for instance to 
the assistance of other subjects, or to the [particular] place and time of the thing that was the 
object of the previous experience.” 
56 See RATIÉ 2006 and TORELLA 2007 on the Pratyabhijñā’s reaction to this theory: Utpaladeva 
and Abhinavagupta both exploit it (so as to criticize the static Brahmanical notions of the 
Self) and criticize it (since they defend the notion of a permanent subject, although they 
consider that this permanency is possible only provided that the subject is understood as a 
dynamic entity capable of undergoing countless transformations). 
57 See above, fn. 21, and RATIÉ forthcoming. 
58 Cf. BIARDEAU 1969, p. 33, who notices that according to Maṇḍanamiśra, avidyā may be 
compared to a play – but a play that belongs to nobody (“le jeu de personne”).  
59 ĪPV, vol. II, p. 179: cidrūpasyaikatvaṃ yadi vāstavaṃ bhedaḥ punar ayam avidyopaplavād 
ity ucyate kasyāyam avidyopaplava iti na saṃgacchate. brahmaṇo hi vidyaikarūpasya 
katham avidyārūpatā? na cānyaḥ kaścid asti vastuto jīvādir yasyāvidyā bhavet. “If [the 
Vedāntin] says that the unity (ekatva) of what consists in consciousness is real (vāstava), 
whereas difference (bheda) is due to the perturbation (upaplava) of nescience (avidyā), [for 
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(kasyāyaṃ vikalpanavyāpāro)?60 For the brahman is pure knowledge (vidyā), 
but the individual subject (jīva) understood as a limited and differentiated being 
is nothing but an effect of this cosmic activity of construction. Abhinavagupta 
thus attacks a particularly sensitive point in his opponents’ conceptual structure: 
the question kasyāvidyā? haunts Advaita Vedānta and divides its proponents.61 
Maṇḍanamiśra – with whose works Abhinavagupta seems to be familiar 62 – 
answers that nescience belongs to the individuals,63 and he himself mentions the 
objections (quite similar to those presented by Abhinavagupta) that such an 
answer could trigger: the brahman, who is pure knowledge, cannot be ignorant, 
but the individuals do not exist independently of the brahman; and if they seem 
to have such an independent existence thanks to the faculty of mental construc-
tion (kalpanā), this faculty in turn cannot belong to the brahman who is pure 
knowledge, but stating that it belongs to the individuals would amount to locking 
oneself in a logical circle (itaretarāśraya), since it would mean attributing to the 
individuals a faculty of imagination that is the very cause of these individuals’ 
________________________________ 
our part we consider that this theory] is inconsistent: to whom (kasya) could this perturbation 
of nescience belong? For how could the brahman – which consists in nothing but knowledge 
(vidyā) – consist in nescience? And [for a Vedāntin,] in reality nobody else exists – such as 
an individual (jīva) – to whom nescience would belong.”  
60 ĪPV, vol. II, pp. 179–180: sadrūpam eva brahmābhinnaṃ cakāsty avikalpena, vikalpabalāt 
tu bhedo’yam iti cet, kasyāyaṃ vikalpanavyāpāro nāma? “If [the Vedāntin were to explain:] 
‘only that whose nature is real (sat) [and] is not distinct from the brahman is manifest while 
not being constructed (avikalpena), whereas difference (bheda) is due to mental construc-
tions (vikalpa)’, [we would ask again: but] this activity of mental construction, to whom 
does it belong?” 
61 Śaṅkara seems to evade the question and to consider it as a false problem. See e.g. the 
BhGBh attributed to Śaṅkara (ad BhG XIII, 2, pp. 371–372): atrāha: sāvidyā kasyeti. yasya 
d śyate tasyaiva. kasya d śyata ity atrocyate: avidyā kasya d śyata iti praśno nirarthakaḥ. 
“[– An objector] then asks: to whom does nescience belong (savidyā kasya)? [The Vedāntin 
answers:] to whoever perceives it. [The objector asks:] So who perceives it? [The Vedāntin] 
answers this [question] thus: the question ‘who perceives nescience?’ is vain (nirarthaka)” 
(cf. INGALLS 1953). Later Vedāntins are divided on this question, some considering that 
nescience belongs to the individual, and others, to the brahman: see e.g. POTTER (ed.) 2006, 
pp. 7–8. 
62 Cf. SANDERSON 1985, p. 210, n. 41 (regarding Śaivism in the tenth and eleventh centuries): 
“when Vedānta is expounded by its opponents in Kashmirian sources of our period it is the 
doctrine of Maṇḍanamiśra which is generally in mind […]. To my knowledge no source 
betrays familiarity with the doctrines of Śaṅkara.”  
63 See BSi, p. 10: yat tu kasyāvidyeti jīvānām iti brūmaḥ. “As for the question: ‘to whom does 
nescience belong (kasyāvidyā)?’, we answer: to the individuals (jīva).” 
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existence according to the Advaita Vedānta.64 Maṇḍanamiśra only avoids these 
difficulties by invoking on the one hand a circular causality that supposedly 
escapes the status of logical defect because it is beginningless,65 and on the other 
hand, the status by nature “inexplicable” of illusion:66 according to the Vedāntin, 
the imaginary creation of the imaginary world has a particularly ambiguous 
64 See BSi, p. 10: nanu na jīvā brahmaṇo bhidyante, evaṃ hy āhānena jīvenātmanānupravi-
śyeti. satyaṃ paramārthataḥ, kalpanayā tu bhidyante. kasya punaḥ kalpanā bhedikā? na 
tāvad brahmaṇas tasya vidyātmanaḥ kalpanāśūnyatvāt, nāpi jīvānāṃ kalpanāyāḥ prāk 
tadabhāvād itaretarāśrayaprasaṅgāt; kalpanādhīno hi jīvavibhāgaḥ, jīvāśrayā kalpaneti. 
“[– An objector:] But the individuals (jīva) are not differentiated from the brahman! For it is 
[precisely because] thus [they are not differentiated from it] that it is said [in Chāndo-
gyopaniṣad VI, 3, 2]: ‘having pervaded by Himself [these three divinities that are brilliance, 
waters and food] in the form of the individual (jīva)...’. [– The Vedāntin:] This is true from 
the point of view of ultimate reality (paramārtha); but they are differentiated by the faculty 
of mental construction (kalpanā). [– The objector:] But to whom does this differentiating 
faculty of mental construction belong? Certainly not to the brahman: since it consists in 
knowledge (vidyā), it is devoid of this faculty of mental construction. But it does not belong 
to the individuals either, because those have no existence before this faculty of mental con-
struction, so that a logical circle (itaretarāśraya) would follow: the distinction between the 
individuals would depend on the faculty of mental construction, [and] the faculty of mental 
construction, on the individuals!” Cf. ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 248: na hi vidyaikarūpasya brahma-
ṇas tadabhāvarūpam avidyā nāma, na cānye jīvādayaḥ kecit; avidyayaiva hi ta utthāpyāḥ. 
“For the brahman, which consists in nothing but knowledge (vidyā), cannot have a form that 
would be an absence of [knowledge], [and] nescience (avidyā) is precisely [such an ab-
sence]; and there is no one else – the individuals (jīva) for instance – [to whom nescience 
could belong], since these [individuals] result from nescience itself!” 
65 See BSi, p. 10: anye tv anāditvād ubhayor avidyājīvayor bījāṅkurasantānayor iva netareta-
rāśrayam aprahḷptim āvahatīti varṇayanti. “But others explain that, because nescience 
(avidyā) and the individual (jīva) are both beginningless (anādi), [this] does not result in the 
fault [consisting in] a logical circle (itaretarāśraya), just as [in the case] of the series of 
seeds and that of the sprouts [that condition each other while it is impossible to determine a 
first moment of the process].” 
66 See Ibid.: atra kecid āhuḥ: vastusiddhāv eva doṣaḥ, nāsiddhaṃ vastu vastvantara-
niṣpattaye’laṃ na māyāmātre. na hi māyāyāṃ kācid anupapattiḥ; anupapadyamānārthaiva 
hi māyā; upapadyamānārthatve yathārthabhāvān na māyā syāt. “Some answer these [ob-
jections in the following way:] there would be a logical defect if [this] were about establish-
ing [the existence of] something real (vastu) – because something that has not been es-
tablished is not capable of making [us] realize something else –, but not if [this] concerns a 
pure and simple illusion (māyāmātra). For as regards illusion, there is absolutely no logical 
impossibility (anupapatti); for illusion (māyā) is precisely that [cognition] of which the 
object is impossible (anupapadyamāna) – if its object were possible, since it would conform 
to its object, it would not be an illusion!” 
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ontological status, since it cannot be explained either in terms of being or in 
terms of non-being,67 and precisely for this reason, we cannot account for it in a 
rational way. Abhinavagupta mocks this so-called inexplicable status: to say that 
it is inexplicable does not exempt the Vedāntin from explaining for whom it is 
thus inexplicable, not to mention that the result of this activity of mental 
construction (i.e., the differentiated world) is manifest, and is therefore perfectly 
explicable in terms of being, since whatever appears exists at least as an appear-
ance. 68  Besides, why should the constructed (vikalpaka) world be unreal 
(asatya), as opposed to the unconstructed reality immediately apprehended in 
any perception?69 For after all, both are manifest, and therefore both are real, at 
67 See BSi, p. 9: nāvidyā brahmaṇaḥ svabhāvo nārthāntaraṃ nātyantam asatī nāpi satī; evam 
eveyam avidyā māyā mithyāvabhāsa ity ucyate. svabhāvaś cet kasya cid anyo’nanyo vā 
paramārtha eveti nāvidyā; atyantāsattve khapuṣpasad śī na vyavahārāṅgam; tasmād anir-
vacanīyā. “Nescience (avidyā) is not the nature (svabhāva) of the brahman, nor anything 
else [besides this nature, since nothing else exists]; it is neither absolutely non-existent 
(asatī) nor [absolutely] existing (satī); precisely because it is so, this nescience is called 
māyā, [i.e.,] an erroneous manifestation (mithyāvabhāsa). If it were the nature of something  
– whether it be different [from this thing] or not –, it would necessarily have a reality in the 
ultimate sense (paramārtha) – therefore it would not be nescience; [but] if it were an ab-
solute non-being (atyantāsattva), such as a flower in the sky, it could not be part of mundane 
experience (vyavahāra). It is therefore inexplicable (anirvacanīya) [either as a being or as a 
non-being].” 
68 ĪPV, vol. II, p. 179: anirvācyeyam avidyeti cet, kasyānirvācyeti na vidmaḥ; svarūpeṇa 
*bhāti ca [L, S1, S2, SOAS: ca bhāti KSTS, Bhāskarī, J; p.n.p. P] *na ca nirvācyeti [J, L, S1, 
S2, SOAS: na cānirvācyeti KSTS, Bhāskarī: conj. PANDEY anirvācyā ceti; p.n.p. P] kim etat? 
yuktyā nopapadyata iti cet saṃvedanatiraskāriṇī kā khalu yuktir nāma? anupapattiś ca 
bhāsamānasya kānyā bhaviṣyati? “If [the Vedāntin answers] that this nescience is inex-
plicable (anirvācya), [for our part,] this is what we do not know: for whom is it inexplicable? 
[And to say] both that it is manifest by nature and that it is inexplicable, what does that 
mean? If [the Vedāntin answers] that it is not possible from the point of view of reason 
(yukti), what on earth is this reason that obscures experience (saṃvedana)? And what other 
impossibility (anupapatti) could there be for what is being manifest, [apart from the im-
possibility not to be manifest]?”. Cf. ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 248: anirvācyā seti cet, kasyeti na 
vidmaḥ. bhāti cānirvācyeti ca yakṣabhāṣā. “If [the Vedāntin answers] that this [nescience] is 
inexplicable (anirvācya), [for our part,] we do not know to whom it belongs. And [saying] 
both that it is manifest and that it is inexplicable is [using] the [incomprehensive] language 
of Yakṣas!” 
69 ĪPV, vol. II, p. 180: brahmaṇaś ced avidyāyogo, na cānyo’sti. avikalpakaṃ ca satyaṃ vi-
kalpakam asatyam iti kuto vibhāgo? bhāsamānatvasyāviśeṣāt. bhāsamāno’pi bhedo bādhita 
iti ced abhedo’py evam, bhedabhāsanena tasya bādhāt. viparītasaṃvedanodaya eva hi 
bādho nānyaḥ kaścit. bādho’pi ca bhāsamānatvād eva san nānyata iti bhedo’pi bhāsamānaḥ 
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least insofar as they are appearances. The constructed universe and the differ-
ence that pervades it are manifest, and one must account for this manifestation 
instead of discarding it as a pure and simple illusion.70 
In contrast, the Pratyabhijñā philosophers consider that the absolute con-
sciousness is indeed the creator of the phenomenal world and of its infinite 
________________________________ 
katham avidyā? bhāsanam avadhīryāgamaikapramāṇako’yam abheda iti ced āgamo’pi 
bhedātmaka evāvastubhūtaḥ pramāt pramāṇaprameyavibhāgaś ceti na kiṃcid etat. “If [the 
Vedāntin answers that nescience] belongs to the brahman, [then the brahman] is associated 
with nescience, [which is impossible according to the Vedāntin’s own principles]; and there 
is no one else [– such as an individual – who could be associated with nescience]. And 
where does [the Vedāntin’s] distinction according to which whatever is not constructed (avi-
kalpaka) is real (satya), and whatever is constructed (vikalpaka), unreal (asatya), come 
from? For [the constructed and the unconstructed] are both manifest (bhāsamāna)! If [the 
Vedāntin answers] that difference (bheda), although manifest, is contradicted (bādhita), [we 
will notice in turn that] the same applies to non-difference (abheda), because it is con-
tradicted by the manifestation of difference; for the contradiction [of a cognition] is only the 
arising of an opposed cognition, and nothing else. Moreover, [the Vedāntin himself con-
siders that] contradiction exists (sat) from the very fact that it is manifest, and for no other 
reason; so why should difference – which is also manifest – be nescience? If [the Vedāntin], 
refusing to take into account manifestation (bhāsana), [answers] that this non-difference has 
as its sole means of knowledge scripture (āgama), [we will answer that] scripture as well, 
insofar as it has difference as its essence and implies a distinction between the knowing 
subject, the means of knowledge and the object to be known, is made unreal (avastubhūta) 
[by the Vedāntin’s very reasoning]; therefore this [argument] is worthless.” 
70 This principle according to which the unconstructed (nirvikalpa, nirvikalpaka) must be 
authentic or real as opposed to the constructed and therefore artificial world of (transcen-
dental) imagination is actually found both in the Buddhist logicians’ works and in the 
Advaita Vedānta. See for intance NB I, 4: according to Dharmakīrti, only the most imme-
diate perception, which is “devoid of mental construction” (kalpanāpodha), is “not erro-
neous” (abhrānta). In the same way, Maṇḍanamiśra for instance considers that perception, 
which is “devoid of mental construction” (avikalpaka), gives us access to the “pure and 
simple reality” (vastumātra), whereas mental constructions that follow it only add to it arti-
ficial features (see e.g. BSi, p. 71: vastumātraviṣayaṃ prathamam avikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam, 
tatpūrvās tu vikalpabuddhayo viśeṣān avagāhanta iti sarvapratyātmavedanīyam. “The first 
perception (pratyakṣa), which is devoid of mental construction (avikalpaka), has as its 
object the pure and simple reality (vastumātra), whereas the mental constructions that 
follow it pervade particularities (viśeṣa): everybody can experience this.”) Of course, this 
similarity should not hide an important divergence: for Dharmakīrti, perception grasps a 
singular entity (svalakṣaṇa), i.e., an entity so particular that it does not share any of its 
features with anything else, and mental constructions produce generalities (sāmānya); 
whereas for Maṇḍanamiśra, mental constructions produce particularities (viśeṣa), thereby 
hiding a reality that is so universal that it is perfectly devoid of any particularity. 
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variety. Only this creation is not ultimately distinct from the creator: just as an 
imagined object is nothing but the imagining consciousness taking the form of 
the imagined object, in the same way, the world is nothing but the absolute 
consciousness taking on an infinity of different forms. And this is possible only 
if the essence of consciousness is not immutability (which appears to the Śaiva 
non-dualists as a lack of power to change) but a fundamental freedom (svā-
tantrya) – a freedom to manifest itself as what it is not without ceasing to be 
oneself, exactly as an imagining consciousness playfully manifests itself as a 
three-trunked elephant without ceasing to be a consciousness.71 From the Pratya-
bhijñā’s perspective, the mental activity through which the world is created is 
neither impersonal nor inexplicable: it springs from the absolute consciousness, 
because this consciousness is constantly engaged in a cosmic creative activity, 
recreating the world pratikṣaṇam, “at every moment”, as Abhinavagupta was 
saying at the end of his commentary on verse I, 6, 10.  
6. Cosmogonic Imagination and the World’s Reality 
One feature of the Pratyabhijñā’s position is particularly worth noting: according 
to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, the very fact that consciousness thus freely 
creates the world by taking its form involves the reality of the world. Thus, 
while commenting on a verse where Utpaladeva states that action requires not 
only a unitary consciousness but also a “will to act”,72 Abhinavagupta explains: 
 tasmād vāstavaṃ cidekatvam abhyupagamyāpi tasya kart tvalakṣaṇā bhinnarūpasamā-
veśātmikā kriyā nopapadyate; parāmarśalakṣaṇaṃ tu svātantryaṃ yadi bhavati tadopa-
padyate sarvam. parāmarśo hi cikīrṣārūpecchā, tasyāṃ ca sarvam antarbhūtaṃ nirmā-
tavyam abhedakalpenāsta ity uktaṃ svāminaś cātmasaṃsthasyety atra. tena svātmarūpam 
eva viśvaṃ satyarūpaṃ prakāśātmatāparamārtham atruḍitaprakāśābhedam eva sat 
prakāśaparamārthenaiva bhedena prakāśayati maheśvara iti tad evāsyātidurghaṭakārit-
valakṣaṇaṃ svātantryam aiśvaryam ucyate.73 
71 On this peculiar feature that radically distinguishes consciousness from objects, see e.g. 
RATIÉ 2007, pp. 353–354, fn. 82. 
72 ĪPK II, 4, 20: vāstave’pi cidekatve na syād ābhāsabhinnayoḥ / cikīrṣālakṣaṇaikatvaparā-
marśaṃ vinā kriyā // “Even though consciousness’s unity (ekatva) is real (vāstava), there 
can be no action in two [entities] differentiated by their manifestation without a grasp 
(parāmarśa) of unity that consists in a will to act (cikīrṣā).”  
73 ĪPV, vol. II, pp. 180–181. 
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 Therefore, even if one admits that “consciousness’s unity is real”, its “action”, that is, its 
agency (kart tva), which consists in taking on “differentiated” forms, is not possible. On the 
other hand, if [consciousness possesses] a freedom (svātantrya) characterized as a grasp 
(parāmarśa), then [consciousness’s action] is perfectly possible!74 For a grasp (parāmarśa) 
is a will (icchā) consisting in a desire to act (cikīrṣā), and in this [will], whatever is the 
object of the creation (nirmātavya) exists continuously (āste) while being internal (antar-
bhūta) [and] while being as it were undifferentiated  (abhedakalpena) [from consciousness] 
– this is what [Utpaladeva has already] said in the [verse beginning with] svāminaś cātma-
saṃsthasya […].75 Therefore the Great Lord (maheśvara) manifests (prakāśayati) the uni-
verse, which consists in nothing but Himself (svātman), the nature of which is real (satya), 
which has as its ultimate reality its identity with the manifesting consciousness (prakāśa) 
[and] which never ceases to be identical with the manifesting consciousness. [He manifests 
this universe] through a differentiation (bheda) that itself has as its ultimate reality the 
manifesting consciousness. This is precisely what is called freedom (svātantrya) or so-
vereignty (aiśvarya) – [a sovereignty] characterized as being the agent of the most difficult 
deeds. 
The universe is real (satya) precisely because it is the product of a cosmic imagi-
nation. Abhinavagupta unfolds the paradox: the universe is nothing but con-
sciousness itself (svātman) appearing as what it is not, that is, as differentiated 
(bhinna) whereas in fact it is absolutely one. And yet this differentiation is not 
unreal, because the only reality is consciousness, and because the nature of con-
sciousness is to manifest itself; so that none of what is manifest can be disre-
garded as unreal.76 The infinitely variegated universe is one of consciousness’s 
74 Or: “then everything is possible!” 
75 ĪPK I, 5, 10: svāminaś cātmasaṃsthasya bhāvajātasya bhāsanam / asty eva na vinā tasmād 
icchāmarśaḥ pravartate // “And there must be (asty eva) a manifestation of all the objects 
[as being] contained in the Lord’s Self; [for] if it were not the case, the grasp that is will 
(icchā) could not take place.” In his commentaries (unfortunately too long to be quoted 
here), Abhinavagupta explains that according to this verse, creative will involves the mani-
festation of both the subject and the object, but that when thus willing to create, the subject 
is still aware that the object (already apprehended with all its distinguishing features) is not 
ultimately different from the consciousness that grasps it. In this will, as Abhinavagupta 
says here, the object of creation is thus manifested “while being as it were undifferentiated” 
from the creating subject. 
76 Thus according to Abhinavagupta, the Vedāntins and the Dharmahīrtian Buddhist, who both 
contend that the phenomenal world is the result of some sort of mental construction, make 
the same mistake when considering that either the difference or the identity pervading the 
phenomenal world must be unreal (since according to the former, only unity is real and “un-
constructed”, whereas according to the latter, only singularity is real and “unconstructed”). 
They are both mistaken because they do not realize that consciousness’s absolute freedom 
allows it to take the most contradictory forms without being shattered by this contradiction: 
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ways of manifesting itself to itself (rather than some illusion inexplicably float-
ing above the absolutely single reality, as in Advaita Vedānta, or the product of 
some impersonal beginningless mechanism of residual traces, as the Buddhist 
Vijñānavādins contend) because consciousness is, in its very essence, creativity.  
Thus according to the Pratyabhijñā, consciousness is not only the totality of 
that which exists, but also the agent of all being, since to exist is in fact to 
perform the act of existing: 
 jaḍasyāpy asti bhavatīty asyām api sattākriyāyāṃ bubhūṣāyogena svātantryābhāvād 
akart tvam, tena pramātaiva taṃ bhāvayati tena tena vā himācalādinā rūpeṇa sa bhavatīty 
atra paramārthaḥ.77 
 Even in this action of being (sattākriyā) [expressed with verbs in the form] “[it] is (asti)”, 
“[it] exists (bhavati)”, the insentient is not an agent (kart ), because of its being devoid of 
________________________________ 
no phenomenon can be considered as devoid of reality, since any phenomenon is con-
sciousness manifesting itself. See e.g. ĪPV, vol. II, pp. 117–118: ihānuv ttaṃ vyāv ttaṃ ca 
cakāsad *vastv ekatareṇa [conj.: vastu katareṇa KSTS, J, L, S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. P] vapuṣā 
na satyam ucyatām ubhayatrāpi bādhakābhāvāt; satyato hi yadi bādhaka evaikatarasya syāt 
tat tadudaye sa eva bhāgaḥ punarunmajjanasahiṣṇutārahito vidyudvilāyaṃ vilīyeta, na 
caivam. ata eva bhedābhedayor virodhaṃ duḥsamartham abhimanyamānair ekair avidyā-
tvenānirvācyatvam, aparaiś cābhāsalagnatayā sāṃv tatvam abhidadhadbhir ātmā paraś ca 
vañcitaḥ. saṃvedanaviśrāntaṃ tu dvayam api bhāti saṃvedanasya svātantryāt. *sarvasya hi 
[Bhāskarī, J: sarvasya KSTS, L, S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. P] tiraśco’py etat svasaṃveda-
nasiddhaṃ yat saṃvidantarviśrāntam ekatām āpādyamānaṃ jalajvalanam apy aviruddham. 
“In this [world], one cannot say about an entity that is manifest both while conforming 
(anuv tta) [to similar entities] and while being excluded (vyāv tta) [from entities that are 
different from it] that it is real (satya) in one of these forms only; because nothing con-
tradicts (bādhaka) any of these two [forms]. For if [one of them] really contradicted the 
other, then, when the one [supposedly contradicting the other] arises, this precise aspect 
[supposedly contradicted,] being deprived of the capacity to appear again, should vanish as a 
flash of lightning vanishes – but it is not the case. For this very reason, some, who consider 
that the contradiction between difference and identity is impossible to justify – [i.e.,] that it 
is inexplicable (anirvācya) since it consists in nescience (avidyā) –, and others, who talk 
about [its] ‘relative truth’ (sāṃv tatva) because it entirely rests on appearances (ābhāsa), 
have fooled themselves as well as the others. Rather, both of them, [identity and difference], 
are manifest [insofar as] they rest on consciousness, by virtue of consciousness’s freedom 
(svātantrya). For even water and fire, since they receive a unity [insofar as] they rest inside 
consciousness, are not contradictory: this is established by [mere] self-consciousness for all 
– even for an animal.” 
77 V tti ad ĪPK II, 4, 20, pp. 60–61. 
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freedom (svātantrya), for [the action of being] implies a desire to be (bubhūṣā)78; therefore 
here is the ultimate reality in this regard: it is the subject who makes the [insentient] be 
(bhāvayati), or [it is the subject who] exists (bhavati) in this or that form – the Himālaya for 
instance. 
To be or to exist are verbs; as any verb, according to the Sanskrit grammarians, 
they denote an action (kriyā) – and as such, they imply a will to act (cikīrṣā), but 
the insentient is incapable of desire. Therefore properly speaking, things do not 
exist (bhavanti): the conscious subject makes them exist (bhāvayati). Some 
learned reader could object that the great poet Kālidāsa himself has chosen to 
begin one of his most famous poems with the affirmation that the mountain 
called Himālaya “is” (asti), and in this first verse of the Kumārasaṃbhava, the 
mountain seems to be the agent of the action of being.79 However, Utpaladeva’s 
lost Viv ti seems to have explained that this is just a poetic licence – or rather, a 
metaphor (upacāra)80, and according to Abhinavagupta, Kālidāsa himself points 
out that this action of being in fact has consciousness as its agent when he 
specifies that Himālaya “has as its Self a divinity” (devatātmā).81 As Utpaladeva 
78 According to Abhinavagupta, the compound bubhūṣāyogena can be understood in two com-
plementary ways. Cf. ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 252: iyatā v ttir ubhayathā gamitā: bubhūṣāyogena 
yat svātantryam, tasyābhāvāt; ayogena ca yaḥ svātantryābhāvas tata iti. “For this reason, 
the V tti should be understood in both ways – as meaning, [on the one hand,] ‘[the insentient 
is not the agent of the action of being], because of [its] absence of freedom, for [the action of 
being] implies a desire to be (bubhūṣā-yogena)’, and [on the other hand], ‘[the insentient is 
not the agent of the action of being], because of [its] absence of freedom, since [it] does not 
possess [a desire to be] (bubhūṣā-a-yogena).”  
79 See ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 248, where KS I, 1ab is quoted: nanu d ṣṭaṃ jaḍasya kart tvam asty 
uttarasyāṃ diśi devatātmā himālayo nāma nagādhirāja iti. “[– An objector:] But [we] see 
that the insentient [too] is the agent (kart ) [of the action of being, in this verse for instance:] 
‘There is (asti), in the Northern area, a Supreme Lord of the mountains, named Himālaya, 
who has as its Self a divinity’!” 
80 See ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 252: nanv evaṃ himavān astīti katham? āha kart topacāras tv iti. “[– 
An objector:] But if it is the case, how can [Kālidāsa say] that the Himālaya ‘exists’? [Utpa-
ladeva] answers [with the sentence beginning with:] ‘however, the metaphor (upacāra) of 
agency […]’.” The Pratyabhijñā philosophers consider that in general, agency cannot belong 
to insentients, so that they are only spoken of as agents metaphorically (cf. RATIÉ 2007, p. 
353); for the same reason, they can “be” – i.e., be the agents of being – only in a metapho-
rical way: in fact, consciousness makes them be. 
81 See ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 248, where, answering the objection, Utpaladeva states that the agent 
of the action (including the action of being) must be the conscious subject (pramāt ) and not 
an insentient entity (jaḍa); Abhinavagupta then adds: etad abhimatam eva sārasvatasya 
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says in his V tti, it is the conscious subject who makes things exist (bhāvayati) 
or performs the action of existing (bhavati) in this or that differentiated form: 
Himālaya is nothing but consciousness performing the action of being the Himā-
laya. 
The Pratyabhijñā philosophers thus oppose to the monistic ontology of 
Advaita Vedānta a dynamic ontology that reveals action at the core of being. 
Commenting on a verse of Utpaladeva according to which “the Lord possesses 
being (sattā), bliss (ānanda), action (kriyā),”82 Abhinavagupta develops the idea 
according to which to be is to act or to be the agent of the action of existing 
(bhavanakart tā) – an action that is nothing but the bliss of being aware of one’s 
own freedom. 83 Similarly, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta designate conscious-
ness as “the Great Being” (mahāsattā) – a notion that they borrow from 
Bhart hari –84 because consciousness’s being is not the existence of this or that 
particular entity, but the freedom to be in the form of all entities – including non-
being,85 as Utpaladeva explains in his V tti: 
________________________________ 
devatātmeti viśayataḥ. “It is precisely the opinion of the divinely inspired [poet, since he] 
specifies [in his verse that Himālaya] ‘has as its Self a divinity’.” 
82 See the beginning of ĪPK IV, 6: sattānandaḥ kriyā patyuḥ ... 
83 ĪPV, vol. II, p. 257: tasya viśvapater yā sattā bhavanakart tā sphurattārūpā pūrvaṃ vyā-
khyātā  sā sphurattā mahāsattety atra, saiva prakāśasya vimarśāvyatirekād vimarśātma-
kacamatkārarūpā satī kriyāśaktir ucyate, paraunmukhyatyāgena svātmaviśrāntirūpatvāc ca 
saivānandaḥ, tad evaṃ bhagavataś cidātmatayaiveyadrūpatā. “This Lord of the universe 
possesses ‘being’ (sattā), [i.e.] the agency as regards the action of existing (bhavanakart tā) 
which consists in a shining forth (sphurattā) already described in [verse I, 5, 14, beginning 
with] ‘it is the shining forth, the Great Being (mahāsattā) […]’. Because [this being] is 
nothing more than the grasp (vimarśa) of the manifesting consciousness (prakāśa), it is what 
[we] call ‘the power of action’ (kriyāśakti), insofar as [this power] consists in a wonder that 
is a grasp (vimarśa); it is also this same [being] that is bliss (ānanda), because it consists in 
resting in oneself (svātmaviśrānti) insofar as it abandons any intentionality with respect to 
any Other (paraunmukhya). Thus the Lord, precisely because it consists in nothing but con-
sciousness, is nothing but this: [being, bliss, action].” 
84 See TORELLA 2002, n. 29, p. 121. On Bhart hari’s influence on Utpaladeva, see TORELLA 
2008. 
85 See ĪPK I, 5, 14 (sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālāviśeṣiṇī / saiṣā sāratayā proktā h dayaṃ 
parameṣṭhinaḥ // “[Consciousness’s grasp (vimarśa)] is a shining forth (sphurattā); it is the 
Great Being (mahāsattā) particularized neither by place nor by time; it is said to be the heart 
of the Supreme Lord because it is His essence”) and Abhinavagupta’s commentary on 
mahāsattā in ĪPV, vol. I, pp. 209–210: sattā ca bhavanakart tā sarvakriyāsu svātantryam. 
sā ca khapuṣpādikam api vyāpnotīti mahatī. “And Being (sattā) is the agency of the action 
of being (bhavanakart tā) – [i.e.,] it is freedom (svātantrya) in all actions. And this [Being] 
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 sphuradrūpatā sphuraṇakart tābhāvāpratiyoginy abhāvavyāpinī sattā bhavattā bhavana-
kart tā nityā deśakālāsparśāt saiva pratyavamarśātmā citikriyāśaktiḥ.86 
 [The shining forth, (sphurattā),87 i.e.], the fact of having one’s form shining forth (sphura-
drūpatā), is the agency as regards the act of shining forth (sphuraṇakart tā); it is the being 
(sattā) that is not the contrary (pratiyogin) of non-being (abhāva), [because] it pervades 
non-being as well; it is existence (bhavattā), which is the agency as regards the act of 
existing (bhavanakart tā), [and] which is eternal because its devoid of any contact with 
place and time; this is the power of action of consciousness (citikriyāśakti) that consists in 
grasping (pratyavamarśa). 
Being pervades everything – including non-being. For non-being exists insofar 
as it is an object for consciousness: we can talk about the flower in the sky be-
cause consciousness makes it exist as a non-being. The Great Being, or being in 
the absolute sense, is the fact – or rather, the act – of being manifest (prakā-
śamānatā); and this act transcends the conceptual contradiction between the 
contraries (pratiyogin) of being and non-being by making this very contradiction 
manifest,88 just as it transcends time and space while pervading all moments and 
________________________________ 
is said to be Great (mahatī) because it pervades even the flower in the sky for instance.” The 
flower in the sky (as the son of a barren woman or the hare’s horn) is a canonical example of 
non-existent object. 
86 V tti, p. 23.  
87 On this word (identified by Utpaladeva with “the Great Being”: see above, fn. 83), cf. 
TORELLA 2002, fn. 31, p. XXIII: with the root sphur-, “the light is enriched by a ‘vibrant’, 
dynamic, connotation – which makes it into the intersection point with the doctrine of the 
Spanda.”  
88 See ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 201: nanv abhāvo bhāvasya pratiyogī. satyaṃ bahiḥsadbhāvasya, na tu 
prakāśamānatāyāḥ. tayā hi vinā pratiyogitaiva kasya? “[– An objector:] But non-being 
(abhāva) is the contrary (pratiyogin) of being (bhāva)! [– Abhinavagupta:] True: [non-being 
is the contrary] of that being which exists externally; but not of [that being which consists 
in] being manifest (prakāśamānatā); for without that one, to whom could the very property 
of being a contrary belong?” On the fact that consciousness, because it is an act of mani-
festation and not just a manifested entity, transcends the contradiction that it makes exist by 
manifesting it, cf. ĪPV, vol. II, pp. 15–16: na caitad vācyam: ekasvarūpasya katham anyad 
anyad rūpam iti? yato nāsau kaścid bhāvo ya evaṃ vikalpyate; saṃvid eva hi tathā bhāti, 
tathābhāsanam eva cāsyā aiśvaryam, na hi bhāsane virodhaḥ kaścit prabhavati.“And one 
cannot object this: ‘how can that which has a unitary nature (ekasvarūpa) possess constantly 
different forms (anyad anyat)?’, because it is not just some entity (bhāva) that is thus being 
imagined; for it is consciousness itself that is manifest thus. And to be manifest thus is 
nothing but the sovereignty (aiśvarya) of [consciousness], for no contradiction (virodha) can 
exert its power as regards manifestation (bhāsana) [itself, as opposed to the manifested].” 
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places.89 This being in the absolute sense is not a static substance: it is neither an 
entity nor a state (both words that might translate the Sanskrit bhāva), but rather, 
the pure dynamism at the source of all acts – “the freedom in all acts” (sarva-
kriyāsu svātantryam) as Abhinavagupta puts it. This freedom equated with “the 
agency as regards the act of existing” (bhavanakart tā) seems to echo the notion 
of bhāvanā (“the bringing into being”) which plays such an important role in 
Bhart hari’s philosophy of language90 as a kind of linguistic potentiality and 
which – again – can be described as some kind of imaginative power.91  
We are now able to understand the full extent of Utpaladeva and Abhinava-
gupta’s statement that the experience of imagination can be a path towards 
Recognition: imagination enables the subject lost in saṃsāra to enjoy the uni-
versal consciousness’s creative freedom – and to experience this creativity as the 
wondrous power to make oneself what one is not without ceasing to be oneself. 
Thus, commenting on a verse by Utpaladeva according to which consciousness 
transforms itself into an object of knowledge while the object remains onto-
logically dependent of consciousness,92 Abhinavagupta explains that conscious-
89 Thus, commenting on the compound deśakālāviśeṣiṇī (“who is particularized neither by 
space nor time”) that qualifies mahāsattā in ĪPK I, 5, 14, Abhinavagupta explains (ĪPV, vol. 
I, pp. 210–211): deśakālau nīlādivat saiva s jatīti tābhyāṃ viśeṣaṇīyā na bhavati. yat kila 
yena tulyakakṣyatayā bhāti tat tasya viśeṣaṇaṃ kaṭaka iva caitrasya. na ca deśakālau 
vimarśena tulyakakṣyau bhātas tayor idantayā tasya cāhantayā prakāśe tulyakakṣyatvā-
nupapatteḥ. evaṃ deśakālāsparśād vibhutvaṃ nityatvaṃ ca, sakaladeśakālasparśo’pi 
tannirmāṇayogād iti tato’pi vyāpakatvanityatve. “[Being] can be particularized neither by 
space nor time, because it itself creates them as [it creates objects such as] the blue, etc. 
[For] only that which is manifest on a similar plane (tulyakakṣyatayā) with [something else] 
particularizes this [other thing], as Caitra’s bracelet [particularizes Caitra as being a brace-
let-bearer]; and space and time are not manifest on a similar plane with [consciousness’s] 
grasp (vimarśa), because the manifestation of [space and time, which occurs] objectively 
(idantayā), and [the manifestation] of this [grasp, which occurs] subjectively (ahantayā), 
could not be on a similar plane. Thus [being] possesses omnipresence and eternity because it 
is devoid of any contact with space and time – but all places and times are in contact [with 
being], because they are associated [to it] insofar as it creates them; consequently, for this 
reason too, it possesses omnipresence and eternity.” 
90 See SHULMAN 2001, pp. 204–208.  
91 See e.g. SHULMAN 2008, p. 482.  
92 ĪPK I, 5, 15: ātmānam ata evāyaṃ jñeyīkuryāt p thaksthiti / jñeyaṃ na tu tadaunmukhyāt 
khaṇḍyetāsya svatantratā // “For this very reason, [consciousness] must make itself an ob-
ject of knowledge (ātmānam...jñeyīkuryāt); nonetheless, the object of knowledge (jñeya) has 
no separate existence – [otherwise consciousness]’s freedom (svatantratā) would be ruined, 
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ness “makes itself an object of knowledge” (svātmānam […] jñeyīkaroti) al-
though in fact it is not an insentient object of knowledge (jñeya), but only a 
knowing subject or agent (jñāt ), because consciousness is free to become aware 
of itself as this or that particular object without ceasing to be consciousness.93 
Bhāskarakaṇṭha in turn explains that consciousness’s power of presenting itself 
as what it is not without ceasing to be itself is a joyful play (krīḍā) in which 
consciousness relishes its own powers;94 and this definition could equally apply 
to the individual subject’s imaginative activity. For ultimately, the freedom that 
Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta invite us to notice in the latter is nothing but the 
freedom of grasping (vimarśa) through which consciousness becomes aware of 
itself as […] (i.e., as itself, or as the countless objects that it creates by taking 
their form) – a freedom so absolute that it transcends even the boundaries of 
identity and non-contradiction,95 and that it is even capable of presenting itself as 
alienated. The individual subjects experience suffering and alienation only inso-
________________________________ 
because of [consciousness’s] intentionality as regards this [object].” For an examination of 
Abhinavagupta’s commentaries on this verse see RATIÉ forthcoming. 
93 ĪPV, vol. I, pp. 214–215: prakāśātmā parameśvaraḥ svātmānaṃ jñātrekarūpatvād ajñeyam 
api jñeyīkarotīti yat saṃbhāvyate kāraṇāntarasyānupapatter darśitatvād d ḍhena saṃ-
bhāvanānumānena,*tad ata eva [Bhāskarī, J, P: tata eva KSTS, L, S1, S2, SOAS] 
vimarśaśaktilakṣaṇāt kart tvād dhetor bhavati; yato hy ayam ātmānaṃ parām śati tato 
viśvanirbharatvāt tathā nīlāditvena cakāsti. “The Supreme Lord (parameśvara), whose Self 
is the manifesting consciousness (prakāśa), ‘makes himself an object of knowledge’ 
(svātmānam […] jñeyīkaroti), although he is not an object of knowledge (ajñeya), because 
he is only a knowing subject (jñāt ). This [thesis, first] stated as a hypothesis because [we] 
have shown the impossibility of any other cause [of the universe] through a firm hypo-
thetical inference, is [now fully] established for this reason: the agency (kart tva) consisting 
in the power of grasping (vimarśaśakti); for it is precisely because this [Lord] grasps himself 
(ātmānaṃ parām śati) [as himself] that, because he is full of the universe, he manifests 
himself as being the blue and [any other object].” 
94 Bhāskarī, vol. I, p. 268: jñeyīkaroti – ajñeyaṃ sat svayaṃ svaśaktyāsvādānarūpakrīḍārthaṃ 
jñeyatayā bhāsayati. “[The Lord] ‘makes himself an object of knowledge (jñeyīkaroti) – 
[i.e.,] although he is not an object of knowledge, he manifests Himself (svayam) as an object 
of knowledge, for the sake of playing (krīḍārthaṃ) – [a play] that consists in relishing 
(āsvādāna) his own powers (śakti).” 
95 ĪPV, vol. I, p. 205: vimarśo hi sarvaṃsahaḥ param apy ātmīkaroty ātmānaṃ ca parīkaroty 
ubhayam ekīkaroty ekīk taṃ dvayam api nyagbhāvayatīty evaṃsvabhāvaḥ. “For [conscious-
ness’s] grasp (vimarśa), which is capable of bearing anything (sarvaṃsaha), has such a 
nature that it transforms into itself (ātmīkaroti) even that which is other (para), and that it 
transforms itself (ātman) into another (parīkaroti); that it makes them one and the same 
entity, and that it negates their unified couple.” 
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far as the absolutely free and blissful consciousness plays at manifesting itself as 
suffering and alienated – and plays at believing that it suffers and that it is 
alienated: thus Abhinavagupta compares the universe to a theatre play (nāṭya), 
and the absolute consciousness to an actor (nāṭaka) “who does not cease to rest 
in his own nature” while playing this or that role.96 
This playful aspect of imagination also constitutes its most paradoxical 
feature: on the one hand, in it consciousness manages to fool itself so to speak; 
for we do believe to some extent in the independent reality of the creations of 
our day-dreamings, or in the fictions that we encounter in poetry or theatre – 
otherwise we would remain perfectly indifferent to them, and we would be in-
capable of enjoying the stories that we tell ourselves or that the others tell us. On 
the other hand though, consciousness always remains conscious that its imagin-
ary creations are nothing but imaginary creations: imagination involves the 
awareness that one is imagining, although it also involves a capacity to playfully 
forget this awareness. According to Abhinavagupta, this mysterious power in-
volved in any act of imagination is, again, nothing but the absolute conscious-
ness’s freedom. Thus, in the TĀ, after asking how consciousness, which is pure 
subjectivity, can present itself as a mere object of consciousness, Abhinavagutpa 
adds: 
 ucyate svātmasaṃvittiḥ svabhāvād eva nirbharā / nāsyām apāsyaṃ nādheyaṃ kiṃcid ity 
uditaṃ purā // kiṃtu durghaṭakāritvāt svācchandyān nirmalād asau / svātmapracchādana-
krīḍāpaṇḍitaḥ parameśvaraḥ // anāv tte svarūpe’pi yad ātmācchādanaṃ vibhoḥ / saiva 
māyā yato bheda etāvān viśvav ttikaḥ //97 
 [To this objection, we] answer that self-consciousness (svātmasaṃvitti) remains full because 
of its very nature;  [we] have [already] stated before that nothing can be substracted nor 
added from it. However, because it is the agent of the most difficult deeds (durghaṭakārin), 
because of its pure freedom (svācchandya), this Highest Lord (parameśvara) [which is con-
sciousness] is skillful at the play (krīḍā) [consisting in] dissimulating oneself (svātmaprac-
chādana). Dissimulating oneself (ātmācchādana) whereas one’s own nature remains 
unveiled (anāv tta): this is precisely the Omnipresent Lord’s māyā from which comes all 
this difference existing throughout the universe. 
Just like the individual subject’s imagining consciousness, the absolute con-
sciousness is capable of playfully ignoring its own nature while it gets engrossed 
in its own creation, and this wondrous power of māyā through which conscious-
96 See ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 244, quoted and translated in RATIÉ 2009. 
97 TĀ 4, 9–11. 
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ness throws itself in some kind of distraction or torpor (moha)98 is the source of 
the phenomenal universe – which is not to say that the phenomenal universe is 
an illusion: it is perfectly real insofar as it is a manifestation of consciousness, 
and it is erroneous (bhrānta) only when grasped as an entity independent of 
consciousness – i.e., only when it is not apprehended as the product of con-
sciousness’s sovereign power of imagination. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Indian philosophy as a whole tends to devaluate imagination. Thus Advaita 
Vedānta or the Vijñānavāda see it as the very root of all alienation and suffering 
98 On this (quite untranslatable) notion of moha, see e.g. ĪPK I, 1, 3, quoted in RATIÉ 2006, p. 
98; cf. RATIÉ 2007, pp. 359–362 and 367 for other passages mentioning it. The term does not 
denote a mere ignorance, but rather, a knowledge that is erroneous (cf. ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 
166: mohasya mithyājñānasya...) because it does not recognize its object as what it really is 
(the French “méconnaissance” is probably not a bad equivalent). However the Sanskrit term 
is full of connotations that no European language seems able to suggest with a single word: 
moha is a kind of paralysis of consciousness – a state of torpor or hebetude in which con-
sciousness is incapable of grasping itself (the term also designates a fainting fit or a coma), 
but it is also a state of confusion, as well as anything (such as a veil or a screen) that 
conceals or obscures; finally, it is the bewilderment in front of something marvellous, and 
the magic art used so as to stupefy an enemy. Abhinavagupta claims that consciousness’s 
power of stupefying oneself without losing one’s self-awareness is not at all “inexplicable”, 
contrary to the Vedāntins’ contention, precisely because it is nothing but consciousness’s 
sovereign freedom. See e.g. ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 80: paśupramāt ṇām akhyātirūpo mohaḥ. 
kāraṇaṃ cāsyeśvaraśaktir iti svarūpataḥ kāraṇataś ca nirvācyataiva. na khalv anirvācyā-
kāraḥ kaścid avidyātmā moho’vastutvenāsyeyadvaicitryaprathanasāmarthyāsaṃbhavāt 
saṃbhave vā pūrṇam eva vastutvaṃ nānirvācyatā. “Distraction (moha) consists in an in-
complete manifestation (akhyāti) [of the nature of the Self] for alienated subjects (paśupra-
māt ). And its cause is the power of the Lord (īśvaraśakti); it is therefore perfectly ex-
plicable (nirvācya) both as regards its nature and as regards its cause. This distraction 
(moha) is not at all some inexplicable appearance (anirvācyākāra) consisting in some ne-
science (avidyā), because it could not have the power to manifest such a diversity if it were 
not real (vastu); and since it can [use this power], it is fully real, and it is not inexplicable.” 
On the meaning of akhyāti here, see ĪPV, vol. II, p. 113: apūrṇakhyātirūpākhyā eva 
bhrāntitattvam. “The essence of error is akhyāti, that is, [not an absence of manifestation, 
but] a manifestation (khyāti) that is incomplete (a- = apūrṇa).” Cf. Bhāskarī, vol. II, p. 123: 
īṣadarthe’tra nañ na tv abhāve. “In the [compound akhyāti], the negation [prefix] has the 
meaning of ‘partial’  (īṣat), and not that of ‘absence’ (abhāva).” 
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insofar as it supposedly produces an artificial or “constructed” world which 
conceals reality. As for the Brahmanical thinkers who regard the phenomenal 
world as a real entity existing independently of consciousness, they seem to 
consider imagination as profoundly misleading insofar as it presents itself as an 
activity of creation ex nihilo, whereas in fact it is entirely determined by latent 
traces; it thus induces the wrong belief that consciousness can manifest a world 
of its own, and it illegitimately casts a metaphysical doubt on the external 
world’s reality. The Pratyabhijñā philosophers agree with the Vedāntins and 
Vijñānavādins that some kind of transcendental imagination is the root of aliena-
tion: according to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, individual subjects suffer and 
are subjected to various determinisms that they do not control only because they 
imagine that they are suffering and alienated, whereas in fact they are all noth-
ing but the free and blissful universal consciousness.99 However, this universal 
consciousness thus imagines itself to be the various individual subjects only 
because imagination is consciousness’ freedom (svātantrya) – a freedom so ab-
solute that consciousness can choose to conceal or ignore its own freedom in 
some kind of mysterious distraction whereby it ceases to pay attention to its own 
nature, in spite of the fact that this nature is ever manifest. In ĪPK I, 6, 10–11 and 
their commentaries, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta therefore endeavour to show 
that when imagining, the individual subject experiences the same limitless free-
dom that characterizes the universal consciousness: not only is his or her imag-
ination a free combination (yojanā) of various elements previously perceived; it 
is also capable of a genuine creation (and not only of a mere rearrangement of 
pre-existing elements), since the imagined object is much more than the simple 
collection of these elements. By grasping the imagined object as a singular 
whole, the imagining consciousness profoundly transforms the already perceived 
constituents, giving rise to a new (nava) entity. Because its essence is vimarśa, 
the power to playfully grasps itself as what it is not without ceasing to be what it 
is, the individual subject’s imagination constitutes a path towards the full meta-
physical liberation which consists in the Recognition (pratyabhijñā) that one is 
not a subject limited by time and space and bound to saṃsāra, but the universal 
consciousness that playfully grasps itself in the form of the phenomenal world – 
hence Abhinavagupta’s beautiful oxymoron of the “freedom of the alienated 
subject” (paśoḥ svātantryam) 100  when talking about the individual subject’s 
imagination: the alienated subject (paśu) can recognize himself as the Lord 
99 See ĪPK IV, 1–3 (cf. RATIÉ 2009, fn. 40, p. 363). 
100 ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 331, quoted above. 
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(pati) because when he imagining, he or she also experiences in the most 
immediate way the creativity at the source of all phenomenal variety. 
Admittedly, towards the end of the treatise, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta 
outline the limits of the individual subject’s imagination that they seem to stretch 
almost infinitely in the texts examined here. Thus in the last section, they 
emphasize that the individual subject’s creation is still limited, not only because 
however new, this creation requires the existence of elementary phenomena 
(ābhāsa), 101  but also because it rests on the power of mental construction 
(vikalpaśakti) which in turn rests on an activity of exclusion (apoha, apohana) 
through which the individual grasps himself as being identical with one 
particular object only (such as his body) to the exclusion of everything else.102 
His imaginary creations are therefore determined to a certain extent by this iden-
tification, so that they are not common (sādhāraṇa) to all subjects, but confined 
to each individual: although we can communicate to others our imaginary crea-
tions (through the mediation of language, visual arts, etc.), we cannot share them 
with the others as we can share the perception of this or that object: their imme-
diate apprehension remains inaccessible to other individuals.103 
101 See e.g. ĪPV, vol. II, pp. 264–265 or ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 381, both quoted above. 
102 See ĪPK IV, 8: te tu bhinnāvabhāsārthāḥ prakalpyāḥ pratyagātmanaḥ / tattadvibhinna-
saṃjñābhiḥ sm tyutprekṣādigocare // “But for the individual self, in the realm of memory, 
fancy, etc., the objects, the manifestations of which are separated, are constructed (pra-
kalpya) through various distinct names.” Abhinavagupta (who specifies that “the realm of 
memory, fancy, etc.” includes imaginary constructions: see ĪPV, vol. II, p. 263: smaraṇa 
utprekṣaṇe saṃkalpane’nyatrānyatra ca vikalpayoge, “in memory, in fancy, in imaginary 
construction (saṃkalpa), and wherever there is an association with a mental construction”) 
explains thus the gist of the verse (Ibid.): etad uktaṃ bhavati: īśvarasya vikalpātmakatām 
antareṇa śuddhavimarśaviṣayībhāvyā arthāḥ, paśos tv anyonyāpohanahevākini vikalpe 
samārūḍḥās te’rthā bhavanti, sāṃsārikahānādānādivyavahāropayogād iti. “Here is what 
[Utpaladeva] means: for the Lord, objects must be apprehended by a grasp that is pure 
(śuddhavimarśa), without consisting in a mental construction (vikalpa); whereas for the 
alienated subject (paśu), these objects exist while resting on a mental construction that is 
engrossed by (hevākin) mutual exclusion (anyonyāpohana), because [they] are useful in the 
mundane activities of those who transmigrate, such as rejecting, giving, etc.” 
103 See ĪPK IV, 9: tasyāsādhāraṇī s ṣṭir īśas ṣṭyupajīvinī / saiṣāpy ajñātayā [corr. TORELLA 
2002 ajñatayā KSTS, Bhāskarī, J, L, S1, S2, SOAS] satyaiveśaśaktyā tadātmanaḥ // “This 
same creation (s ṣṭi) of the [individual subject] whose Self is the [Lord] is not common 
(asādhāraṇī) [to other subjects and] depends on the creation of the Lord; it is real thanks to 
the power of the Lord, although [the individual subject] does not know [this power].” Cf. 
ĪPV, vol. II, p. 263: paśukart kā s ṣṭis teṣām arthānām īśvaras ṣṭānām uparivartinī, ata eva 
tām īśvaras ṣṭim upajīvanty asādharaṇī pratipramāt niyatā. “The creation (s ṣṭi) having as 
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However, the goal of Recognition is precisely to resorb this difference so as 
to attain a state where the subject’s imagination is perfectly free of any kind of 
boundary or determination: the individual’s imagination is limited only insofar 
as he imagines it to be limited, and the individual is not alienated because of 
imagination, but because he does not realize the full extent of his power of 
imagination. Utpaladeva therefore claims that someone who has fully realized 
his identity with the absolute consciousness knows and creates objects at will,104 
probably as these yogins whom he believes to be capable of creating at will and 
without any material cause objects that become perceptible to everybody:105 in 
the Pratyabhijñā, liberation seems to amount to an infinite expansion of imagi-
nation – or rather, to the realization that one’s imagination is infinite. Para-
doxically though, this identification of the phenomenal world with an imaginary 
creation does not lead at all to some illusionistic theory. The various perceived 
entities could be considered as unreal only if the absolute consciousness pro-
duced them while disregarding or concealing an external reality; but according 
to the Pratyabhijñā philosophers, since they are created by a dynamic conscious-
ness which constitutes the only reality and which freely chooses to appear in 
their form, they are an aspect of reality: the world is real precisely because it is 
imagined. 
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